Property Rights for the Poor: Effects of Land Titling by Sebastian Galiani & Ernesto Schargrodsky
 
Almirante Sáenz Valiente 1010 C1428BIJ Buenos Aires • Tel: (54 11) 4783.3112 
Fax: (54 11) 4783.3220 •  Web site: www.utdt.edu/departamentos/empresarial/cif/cif.htm 
C CI IF F   





ESCUELA DE NEGOCIOS 













Property Rights for the Poor:  











Universidad Torcuato Di Tella  
 
 
Property Rights for the Poor: 





Universidad de San Andres 
 
Ernesto Schargrodsky* 
Universidad Torcuato Di Tella 
 





Secure property rights are considered a key determinant of economic development. The 
evaluation of the causal effects of land titling, however, is a difficult task as the allocation 
of property rights is typically endogenous. We exploit a natural experiment in the 
allocation of land titles to overcome this identification problem. More than twenty years 
ago, a group of squatters occupied a piece of land in a poor suburban area of Buenos 
Aires. When the Congress passed a law expropriating the land from the former owners 
with the purpose of entitling it to the occupants, some of the original owners accepted 
the government compensation, while others are still disputing the compensation 
payment in the slow Argentine courts. These different decisions by the former owners 
generated an allocation of property rights that is exogenous in equations describing the 
behavior of the squatters. We find that entitled families increased housing investment, 
reduced household size, and improved the education of their children relative to the 
control group. However, effects on credit access are modest and there are no effects on 
labor income. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The fragility of property rights is considered a crucial obstacle for economic development 
(North and Thomas, 1973; North, 1981; De Long and Shleifer, 1993; Johnson et al., 
2002; inter alia). The main argument is that individuals underinvest if others can seize 
the fruits of their investments (Demsetz, 1967; Alchian and Demsetz, 1973). In today’s 
developing world, a pervasive manifestation of feeble property rights are the millions of 
people living in urban dwellings without possessing formal titles of the plots of land they 
occupy (Deininger, 2003). The absence of formal property rights constitutes a severe 
limitation for the poor. Besides its investment effects, the lack of formal titles impedes the 
use of land as collateral to access the credit markets (Feder et al., 1988). It also affects 
the transferability of the parcels (Besley, 1995), making investments in untitled parcels 
highly illiquid. In addition, the absence of formal titles deprives poor families of the 
possibility of having a valuable insurance and savings tool that could provide protection 
during bad times and retirement, forcing t hem instead to rely on extended family 
members and offspring as insurance mechanisms.  
 
Land-titling programs have been recently advocated  in policy circles as a powerful 
instrument for poverty reduction. De Soto (2000) emphasizes that the lack of property 
rights impedes the transformation of the wealth owned by the poor into capital. Proper 
titling could allow the poor to collateralize the land. In turn, this credit could be invested 
as capital in productive projects, promptly increasing labor productivity and income. 
Inspired by these ideas, governments, NGOs, and international development agencies 
have fostered land-titling programs throughout developing and transition economies. For 
example, the Peruvian government issued property titles to 1.2 million urban households 
during the 1990s, millions of titles are being issued in Vietnam and Cambodia, while 
President Lula announced during his first week in office a massive plan to title the huge 
favelas of the major Brazilian cities. 
 
In this paper, we investigate the effects of issuing land titles to a very deprived 
population. The identification of land-titling effects, however, is a difficult task because it 
typically faces the problem that formal property rights are endogenous. The allocation of 
property rights across households is usually not random but based on wealth, family 
characteristics, individual effort, previous investment levels, or other mechanisms built   2 
on differences between the groups that acquire those rights and the groups that do not. 
Exogenous variability in the allocation of property rights is necessary to solve this 
selection problem. 
 
Effects of land titling have been documented by several studies. A partial listing includes 
Jimenez (1984), Alston et al. (1996) and Lanjouw and Levy (2002) on real estate values; 
Besley (1995), Jacoby et al. (2002), Brasselle et al. (2002) and Do and Iyer (2002) on 
agricultural investment; Field (2003) on labor supply; and Feder et al. (1988), Place and 
Migot-Adholla (1998), Carter and Olinto (2002), and Field and Torero (2003) on access 
to credit. Until recently, the problem of endogeneity was ignored. Besley (1995) is the 
first paper to seriously deal with it, and still remains the benchmark study in this area. His 
results, however, are not conclusive. On one hand, the exclusion restrictions adopted to 
identify the parameter of interest are uninformed and questionable. On the other hand, 
the findings are ambiguous. Land rights appear to have a positive effect on investment in 
the Ghanaian region of Anloga but a less noticeable impact on the region of Wassa. 
Using a similar empirical strategy, Jacoby et al. (2002) find positive effects in China, 
whereas Brasselle et al. (2002) find no  effects  for Burkina Faso.  An alternative 
identification strategy has been r ecently presented by Field (2003). She exploits the 
timing variability in the regional implementation of the Peruvian titling program using 
cross-sectional data on past and future title recipients midway through the project. A 
serious concern with the validity of her findings, however, is that the program timing 
across cities and within neighborhoods of each city could be correlated with the 
outcomes of interest. 
 
The distinctive characteristic of our study is that we exploit a natural experiment in the 
allocation of property rights to identify the causal effects of land titling. More than 20 
years ago, a group of squatters occupied an area of wasteland in the outskirts of Buenos 
Aires, Argentina. The area was composed of different tracts of land, each with a different 
legal owner. An expropriation law was subsequently passed, ordering the transfer of the 
land from the original owners to the state in exchange for a monetary compensation, with 
the purpose of entitling it to the squatters. However, only some of the original legal 
owners surrendered the land. The parcels located on the ceded tracts were transferred 
to the squatters with legal titles that secured the property of the parcels. Other original 
owners, instead, are still disputing the government compensation in the slow Argentine   3 
courts. As a result, a group of squatters obtained formal land rights, while others are 
currently living in the occupied parcels without paying rent, but without legal titles. Both 
groups share the same household pre-treatment characteristics. Moreover, they live next 
to each other, and the parcels they inhabit are identical. Since the decision of the original 
owners of accepting or disputing the expropriation payment was orthogonal to the 
squatter characteristics, the allocation of property rights is exogenous in equations 
describing the behavior of the occupants. Thus, this natural experiment provides a 
control group that estimates what would have happened to the treated group in the 
absence of the intervention, allowing us to identify the causal effects of land titling. 
 
Our study involves the comparison of treated households that possess formal land titles 
with control households that occupy similar tracts of land without titling. Thus, our 
treatment coincides with the intervention of interest in policy analysis in the developing 
world, where most titling programs consist of issuing formal titles to the current land 
inhabitants. A further advantage of our study is that we possess exact knowledge of the 
titling status of each parcel. On one hand, this eliminates any concern about the 
measurement of the treatment variable. On the other hand, this allows us to detect some 
cases of treatment non-compliance, and therefore identify treatment effects and not just 
intention-to-treat effects.  Finally, we study the long-term effects of land titling. This is 
quite important since it is likely that several effects, such as changes in investment, 
fertility and education, take time to materialize. Naturally, as in all long-term studies, 
some participants inevitably dropped out from the analysis. Our experiment allows us to 
explicitly address this potential problem. 
 
Exploiting this natural experiment,  we find significant effects on housing investment, 
household size, and child education. The quality of the houses is substantially higher in 
the titled parcels. Moreover, households in the titled parcels have a smaller size, both 
through a diminished presence of extended family members and through a reduced 
fertility of the household heads, and they invest more in the education of their children. 
However, we only find modest effects on access to credit markets as a result of 
entitlement, and no improvement in labor market performance. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the natural 
experiment. In section III we present our data, and in section IV we discuss the   4 
econometric methods. Section V presents our empirical results, while section VI 
concludes. 
 
II. A Natural Experiment 
 
The empirical evaluation of the effects of land titling typically poses a major 
methodological challenge. In most historical experiences, the allocation of property rights 
across families is not random but based on wealth, family characteristics, individual 
effort, previous investment levels, or other selective mechanisms. Thus, the individual 
characteristics that determine the likelihood of receiving land titles are probably 
correlated with the outcomes under study. Since some of these personal characteristics 
are unobservable, this correlation creates a selection problem that obstructs the proper 
evaluation of the effects of property right acquisition. 
 
In this paper, we address this selection problem by exploiting a natural experiment in the 
allocation of property rights. In 1981, about 1,800 families occupied a piece of wasteland 
in San Francisco Solano, County of Quilmes, in the Province of Buenos Aires, Argentina. 
The occupants were groups of landless citizens organized through a Catholic chapel. As 
they wanted to avoid creating a shantytown, they partitioned the occupied land into small 
urban-shaped parcels. At the beginning of the occupation the squatters believed that the 
land belonged to the state, but it was actually private property. The occupants resisted 
several attempts of eviction during the military government. After Argentina's return to 
democracy, the Congress of the Province of Buenos Aires passed Law Nº 10.239 in 




                                                                  
1 On the details of the land occupation process see Briante (1982), CEUR (1984), Izaguirre and 
Aristizabal (1988), Fara (1989), and the documentary movie “Por una tierra nuestra” by Cespedes 
(1984). Information on the land expropriation process was obtained from the Land Secretary of 
the Province of Buenos Aires, the office of the General Attorney of the Province of Buenos Aires, 
the Quilmes County Government, the Land Registry, and the judicial cases. Additional 
information was gathered through a series of interviews with key informants, including the 
Secretary of Land of the Province of Buenos Aires (Maria de la Paz Dessy), Undersecretary of 
Land of the Province of Buenos Aires (Alberto Farias), Directors of Land of Quilmes County 
(Daniel Galizzi and Alejandro Lastra), Secretary of Public Works and Land Registry of Quilmes 
County (Hector Lucas), General Attorney of the Province of Buenos Aires (Ricardo Szelagowski), 
attorney in expropriation offers’ office (Claudio Alonso), lawyer on expropriation lawsuit (Horacio   5 
According to the expropriation law, the government would pay a monetary compensation 
to the former owners and it would then allocate the land to the squatters. In order to 
qualify for receiving the titles, the squatters should have arrived to the parcels at least 
one year before the sanctioning of the law, should not possess any other property, and 
should use the parcel as their family home. Within each household, the titles would be 
awarded to both the household head identified at that time and to her/his spouse (if 
married or cohabitating). The law also established that the squatters could not transfer 
the property of the parcels for the first ten years after titling. 
 
The process of expropriation resulted to be asynchronous and incomplete. The occupied 
area turned out to be composed of thirteen tracts of land belonging to different owners. 
In 1986, the government offered each owner (or group of co-owners, as several tracts of 
land had more than one owner) a payment proportional to the official valuation of each 
tract of land, indexed by inflation. These official valuations, assessed by the tax authority 
to calculate property taxes, had been set before the land occupation. After the 
government made the compensation offers, the owner/s of each tract had to decide 
whether to surrender the land (accepting the expropriation compensation) or to start a 
legal dispute. Eight former owners accepted the compensation offered by the 
government. Five former owners, instead, did not accept the government offer and filed 
charges with the aim of obtaining a higher compensation. In 1989-91, the tracts of land 
of the former owners that accepted the government compensation were transferred to 
the squatters occupying them, together with formal land titles that secured the property 
of the parcels.
2,3 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Castillo), former land owners (Hugo Spivak and Alejandro Bloise  -heir-), squatters (Juan Carlos 
Sanchez and Jorge Valle, inter alia), and President of NGO Gestion Urbana (Estela Gutierrez). 
2 The “new” urban design traced by the squatters sometimes differed from the previous land tract 
divisions. Thus, some “new” parcels overlapped over tracts of land that belonged to different 
owners. For regulatory reasons, parcels could not be delimited and titled if one portion of them 
was still under dispute. 
3 The market value of land parcels comparable to the ones titled to the squatters amounted to 
approximately 7.4 times the monthly average total household income for the first quintile of the 
official household survey (EPH) of October 1986 for the Buenos Aires metropolitan area (market 
value of parcels  in the neighboring non-squatted area  obtained from evidence presented in 
“Kraayenbrink de Beurts et al. v. Province of Buenos Aires”). This figure, however, constitutes 
only an upper bound of the wealth transfer received by the entitled households for two reasons. 
First, the expropriation law established that each titled squatter had to pay the government the 
proportionally prorated share of the official valuation of the occupied tract of land. The law, 
however, established that the payments should be made in monthly installments that could never 
surpass 10% of the (observable) household income and there was no indexation for inflation. 
Given the hyperinflationary periods experienced by the Argentine economy during the period of   6 
 
The people who occupied parcels located on the tracts of land that belonged to the 
former owners that accepted the expropriation compensation, were ex-ante similar, and 
arrived at the same time, than the people who settled on the tracts of the former owners 
that did not surrender the land. There was simply no way for the occupants to know ex-
ante, at the time of the occupation, which parcels of land had owners who would accept 
the compensation and which parcels had owners who would dispute it. In fact, at the 
time of the occupation the squatters believed that all the land was state-owned and they 
could not know that an expropriation law was going to be passed, nor what was going to 
be the future response of the owner of each specific parcel. 
 
A potential concern, however, is that the different former owners’ decisions could reflect 
differences in land quality. In turn, these differences could be correlated with squatters’ 
heterogeneity. For example, more powerful squatters could have settled  in the best 
parcels. An advantage of our experiment is that the parcels of land in the treatment 
(titled) and control (untitled) groups are almost identical and basically next to each other. 
Indeed, after the data description, we show in Section IV that there are no differences in 
observable parcel characteristics (distance to a polluted creek, distance to the closest 
non-squatted area, parcel surface, location in a corner of a block) between the treatment 
and control groups.
4 We also show that there are no differences in pre-treatment 
observable household characteristics (gender, nationality and years of education of the 
person who was the household head at the time of the occupation, and nationality and 
years of education of her/his parents). Importantly, the squatters had no direct contact 
with the former owners to influence their decisions and the dwellings constructed by the 
squatters were deliberately ignored in the calculation of the expropriation compensation. 
Moreover, the government offers were very similar (in per-square-meter terms) for the 
accepting and contesting owners, in accordance with the proximity and alikeness of the 
land tracts.
5 Given the similarity in land quality and compensation offers, the different 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
analysis and the high labor informality of this population, the real values paid by the squatters 
were probably quite small. In practice, there are no records of the amounts and dates of the 
payments made by each household. Second, entitled households are supposed to regularly pay 
property taxes. 
4 There are also no differences in altitude. The Buenos Aires metropolitan area is totally flat and 
all these parcels are within the same 5-meter topographical range. Besides, as this is urban land, 
agricultural productivity is not an issue. 
5 In Argentine pesos (of January 1986) per square meter, the accepted offers had a mean of 
0.424 and a median of 0.391. The contested offers had a mean of 0.453 and a median of 0.397.   7 
responses might instead reflect heterogeneity of the former owners regarding subjective 
land value, litigation costs, or decision-making.
6 Finally, note that if, in spite of this 
discussion, one may still fear that the challenging owners did so because the quality of 
their land was higher, that would imply that the squatters that did not receive titles are 
standing on land of better quality. 
 
As explained, five former owners did not accept the compensation offered by the 
government and went to trial. In these lawsuits, all the legal discussion hinges around 
the determination of the monetary compensation. The Congress constitutionally 
approved the law and, thus, the expropriation itself could not be challenged. The 
squatters had no participation in these legal processes (the lawsuits were between the 
former owners and the provincial government), and the value of the dwellings they 
constructed was explicitly excluded from the dispute over the monetary compensation 
(“Cordar SRL v. Province of Buenos Aires”). One of these five lawsuits ultimately ended 
with a final verdict, and the squatters on this tract of land received titles in 1998. The 
other four lawsuits are still pending in the slow Argentine courts. If one is still worried 
about the possibility that the former owners’ decisions of surrendering or suing was 
correlated with land quality or squatters’ characteristics, then an additional feature of this 
experience is that it allows us to separately compare the squatters in this lastly titled tract 
of land relative to the control group. Although these two groups of squatters settled in 
tracts of land which are homogenous regarding their respective former owners’ decisions 
of going to trial, one group already received titles while the other is still waiting for the 
end of the legal processes.
7 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Indeed, the similitude of the offers is repeatedly  used as an argument by the government 
attorneys in the expropriation lawsuits to demonstrate that the government offers were fair, as 
they were similar to the ones accepted by other owners. The same argument is utilized in a low-
court verdict in “Kraayenbrink de Beurts et al. v. Province of Buenos Aires” citing jurisprudence of 
the Supreme Court. 
6 The average number of co-owners in the groups of accepting owners is 1.25, while the average 
number of co-owners for the contested tracts is 2.2. Moreover, when we defined a dummy equal 
to 1 if there is more than one co-owner sharing the same family name, and 0 otherwise, the 
average for this dummy for the accepting owners is 0.125 while the average for the challenging 
owners is 0.6. Thus, it appears that having many co-owners and several in the same family made 
it more difficult for the owners to agree on accepting the government offer. Within the challenging 
owners, we also found one case in which an owner was a lawyer who was representing himself in 
the case (which may suggest lower litigation costs), while in another case, one of the original 
owners had passed away before the sanctioning of the law but her inheritance process was still 
under way at the time the family had to make a decision. 
7 We can still wonder, within this group of former owners that disputed the compensation, why 
some are still on trial while one concluded. Exogenous reasons lengthened these trials. In two   8 
 
The final outcome of this expropriation process is that a group of families now has legal 
property rights, while another group is still living in the occupied parcels enjoying free 
usufructuary rights but without possessing formal land titles. This allocation of land titles 
was the result of an expropriation process that did not depend on any particular 
characteristic of the squatters nor of the parcels of land they occupied. Thus, by 
comparing the groups that received and did not receive land titles, we can act as if we 
have a randomized experiment, which allows us to identify the effects of land titling using 
cross-sectional information. 
 
III. Data Description 
 
The area affected by Expropriation Law Nº 10.239 covers a total of 1,839 parcels. 1,082 
of these  parcels are located in a contiguous set of blocks. However, the law also 
included another non-contiguous (but close) piece of land currently called San Martin 
neighborhood, which comprises 757 parcels. As this area is physically separated from 
the rest, we focus on the 1,082 contiguous parcels to improve comparability, and then 
pool the San Martin parcels when we analyze the robustness of our findings. 
 
We have precise knowledge of the legal status of each parcel. Land titles were awarded 
in two phases. Property titles were awarded to the occupants of 419 parcels in 1989, 
and to the occupants of 173 parcels in 1998. Land titles are not available to the families 
living in 410 parcels located on tracts of land that have not been surrendered to the 
government in the expropriation process. Finally, there are 80 parcels that were not titled 
to the squatters because the occupants had moved or died at the time of the title offers, 
or had not fulfilled some of the required registration steps, although the original owners 
had surrendered these pieces of land to the government. For these potentially 
endogenous reasons, the inhabitants of these 80 parcels (out of the 672 parcels offered 
for titling) missed the opportunity to receive a title, i.e. missed the opportunity to receive 
the treatment. Borrowing the terminology from clinical trials, this subgroup constitutes the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
cases, the expropriation lawsuit was delayed by the death of one of the former owners, which 
required an inheritance process. In another case (mentioned in footnote 6) one of the original 
owners had died just before the sanctioning of the law and her inheritance process had not 
finished. In the fourth case, the legal process was delayed by a mistake made in the description 
of the land tract in a low-court judge’s verdict.   9 
“non-compliers” in our study, since they were offered the treatment (land title) but they 
did not receive it. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the process of allocation of land titles for the main area. The 
variable Property Right Offer equals 1 for the families occupying parcels that were 
surrendered by the original owners, and 0 otherwise; while the variable Property Right 
equals 1 for the squatters that received property titles, and 0 otherwise.
8 
 
Table 1 – Allocation of Land Titles 
Property Right Offer = 1 
Year 
Property 
Right = 1 
Property 
Right = 0  Total 
Property Right 
Offer = 0  & 
Property 
Right = 0 
Total 
1989  419  23  442     
1998  173  57  230     
Total  592  80  672  410  1082 
 
A survey performed in 2003 provides the data utilized for this study. The inhabitants of 
590 randomly selected parcels (out of the total of 1,839) were interviewed. 617 
households living in these 590 parcels (27 parcels host more than one family) were 
surveyed. Excluding the non-contiguous San Martin neighborhood, we interviewed 467 
households living in 448 parcels. At the same time, we sent a team of architects to 
perform an outside evaluation of the characteristics of the houses.
9 
 
IV. Econometric Methods 
 
We seek to identify treatment effects on outcome variables. To answer such questions, 
statisticians (e.g., Kish, 1987) recommend a formal two-stage statistical model. In the 
first stage, a random sample of participants is selected from a defined population. In the 
                                                                  
8 The 757 parcels of San Martin, which belonged to an owner who accepted the expropriation 
compensation without suing, were offered for titling in 1991. 712 were titled, while 45 correspond 
to non-compliers. 
9 Gestion Urbana, an NGO that works in this area, carried out the household survey and the 
housing evaluation. The interviewers and the architects were not informed of the hypotheses 
under study and were blind to the treatment status of each parcel. We distributed a food stamp of 
$10 (about 3 US dollars at the time of the survey) for each answered survey as a token of 
gratitude to the families willing to participate in our study. In 10 percent of the cases, the survey 
could not be performed because there was nobody at home in the three visit attempts, the parcel   10 
second stage, this sample of participants is randomly assigned to treatment and 
comparison (control) conditions. This two-stage model, however, has almost never been 
implemented in practice by researchers in the behavioral sciences. While health 
researchers frequently test treatments through randomized experiments, these 
randomized trials are nearly always implemented on a convenience sample of volunteers 
(one-stage randomized trials).  
 
In economics, even one-stage randomized experiments are rare, and in many cases 
impossible to implement. Nevertheless, economists can, sometimes, preserve the 
central feature of a randomized experiment by exploiting natural experiments. In a 
natural experiment, like in a randomized trial, there is a control group that estimates what 
would have happened to the treated group in the absence of the intervention, but nature 
or other exogenous forces determine treatment status instead. The validity of the control 
group is evaluated by examining the exogeneity of treatment status with respect to the 
potential outcomes, and by testing that the pre-intervention characteristics of the 
treatment and control groups are reasonably similar. 
 
In section II we discussed at length the exogeneity of the allocation of land title offers 
among the squatters and argued that this process was not triggered by some 
phenomenon that affected differently the treatment and control groups in our experiment. 
We now test the similarity of pre-treatment characteristics between these two groups.  
 
In Table 2, we compare parcel characteristics for the non-intention-to-treat and intention-
to-treat groups (i.e., Property Right Offer = 0 and Property Right Offer = 1, respectively) 
to analyze the presence of potential differences. The variables under comparison are 
distance to a nearby (polluted and floodable) creek, distance to the closest non-squatted 
area, parcel surface, and a dummy for whether the parcel is located in a corner of a 
block. We only reject the hypotheses of equality for parcel surface (at the 8.9% level of 
significance). Nevertheless, the difference in average parcel surfaces between these two 
groups is relatively small –parcels are only 3% larger in the non-intention-to-treat group– 
and if something, it is the control group the one that inhabits slightly larger parcels. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
was not used as a house, rejection, or other reasons. These parcels were randomly replaced. 
Non-response rates were similar for titled and untitled parcels.   11 
Table 2 – Pre-Treatment Parcel Characteristics 











0.088     
(0.070) 
Distance to Non-Squatted 
Area (in blocks) 
1.731      
(0.058) 





(in squared meters) 
287.219     
(4.855) 
277.662     
(2.799) 
9.556*     
(5.605) 
Block Corner=1  0.190     
(0.019) 
0.156      
(0.014) 
0.033     
(0.023) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%. 
 
In Table 3, we compare pre-treatment characteristics of the “original squatter” between 
the non-intention-to-treat and intention-to-treat groups (i.e., Property Right Offer = 0 and 
Property Right Offer = 1, respectively) for the families that arrived before treatment. We 
define the “original squatter” as the household head at the time the family arrived to the 
parcel they are currently occupying. We cannot reject the hypotheses of equality in 
gender, nationality and years of education of the original squatter, suggesting a strong 
similarity between these groups at the time of their arrival to this area. Moreover, we do 
not reject the hypotheses of equality in nationality and years of education of the mother 
and father of the original squatter across the groups, suggesting that these groups had 
been showing similar trends in their socio-economic development before their arrival to 
this area.
10 The similarity across pre-treatment characteristics is  consistent with the 









                                                                  
10 In 23 percent of the cases, the current household head does not coincide with the original 
squatter, either because she/he arrived later than the first member of the family that occupied the 
parcel, or because she/he arrived at the same time but was not the household head at the arrival 
time. This percentage is similar for the treatment and control groups. We obtain similar results 
when we compare the pre-treatment characteristics of the current household head between the 
two groups.   12 
Table 3 – Pre-Treatment Characteristics of the Original Squatter 





































Years of Education of 













Years of Education of 







Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Once treatment status has been shown to be ignorable, estimation of average treatment 
effects is straightforward. Operationally, we analyze the effects of land titling on variable 
Y by estimating the following regression model: 
 
i i i i e b g a + + + = X   Right  Property  Y       (1) 
 
where Y i is any of the outcomes under study, and g is the parameter of interest, which 
captures the causal effect of Property Righti (a dummy variable indicating the possession 
of land title) on the outcome under consideration.
11 X i is a vector of pre-treatment parcel 
and original squatter characteristics and e i is the error term.
12 
 
A typical concern when conducting statistical inference after estimating the parameters 
of equation (1) is that the errors in that equation might not be independent across 
                                                                  
11 Some of the variables under study are Limited Dependent Variables (LDV). Angrist (2001) 
argues that the problem of causal inference with LDV is not fundamentally different from the 
problem of causal inference with continuous outcomes. If there are no covariates or the 
covariates are sparse and discrete, linear models (and associated estimation techniques like two-
stage least squares) are no less appropriate for LDV than for other types of dependent variables. 
Certainly, this is the case in a natural experiment where controls are only included to improve 
efficiency, but their omission would not bias the estimates of the parameters of interest.   13 
households. For example, treatment might interact with parcel characteristics and hence, 
it might affect similarly households residing nearby. In order to control for these potential 
nuisances, we also compute standard errors clustering the parcels located in the same 
block and the parcels belonging to the same former owner.
13 
 
To this point, our model has assumed that all the squatters actually received the 
treatment to which they were assigned. In many experiments, however, a portion of the 
participants fail to follow the treatment protocol, a problem termed treatment non-
compliance. In our case, this might be of potential concern since a number of families 
that were offered the possibility of obtaining land titles did not receive them for reasons 
that may also affect their outcomes. In order to address this problem of non-compliance, 
we also report estimates of the treatment effects by the method of Two-Stages Least 
Squares (2SLS) where we instrument the Property Right dummy variable using the 
intention-to-treat variable Property Right Offer, a dummy variable indicating the 
availability of land title offers (see Angrist et al., 1996). 
 
Finally, in any investigation where the impact takes time to materialize (like the 
investment, fertility and education variables considered in this paper), some participants 
will inevitably drop out from the analysis. For example, the most widely used longitudinal 
dataset in economics, the Michigan Panel Study on Income Dynamics, has 
experimented a 50 percent sample loss from cumulative attrition after 30 years from its 
initial sample (see Fitzgerald et al., 1998).
14 Participation attrition, hence, is another 
potential problem that might bias the estimates of causal effects in long-term studies. 
 
In our survey, we found that some families arrived to the parcel they are currently 
occupying after the time the former owners made, during 1986, the decision of surrender 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
12 Our estimates show no change if we include as controls the personal characteristics of the 
current household head instead of those of the original squatter, when they differ. 
13 For the former owner clustering, if a parcel overlaps on the borders of the previous tract 
divisions, occupying a piece of land that belonged to one owner and another piece that 
corresponded to another owner, the former owner is defined as the combination of the two former 
owners. For the block clustering, a block is defined as both sides of the segment of a street 
between two corners. These procedures define 18 former owner clusters and 83 block clusters. 
Similar results are obtained using other clustering units, such as each sidewalk of a block or the 
rectangular block delimited by consecutive streets. 
14  See also Alderman et al. (2003). Krueger (1999) and Behrman et al. (2003) are examples of 
long-term impact studies with large participation attrition. Previous studies of land-titling effects 
ignore this issue.    14 
the land or sue. From the sample of 467 interviewed households, we found that 313 
families had arrived to the parcel before the end of 1985, while 154 families arrived after 
1985.
15 As it is plausible to argue that the families that arrived after the former owners’ 
decisions could have known the different expropriation status (i.e., the  different 
probabilities of receiving the land) associated to each parcel, to guarantee exogeneity 
we need to exclude from the analysis the families that arrived to the parcel they are 
currently occupying after 1985. This raises a problem of attrition. If some families arrived 
after 1985, they could have replaced some original squatters in our treatment and 
control parcels that had left before we ran our survey in 2003.
16 Moreover, the availability 
of titles could have affected household migration decisions. Indeed, the first column of 
Table 4 shows that 62.4 percent of the parcels in the non-intention-to-treat group are 
inhabited by families that arrived before 1986, while the proportion is 70.0 percent for the 
intention-to-treat group. 
 














Household arrived before 
1986=1 
0.624     
(0.036) 
0.700    
(0.028) 
0.729     
(0.051) 
0.689     
(0.033) 
Difference relative to 
Property Right Offer=0    -0.076*     
(0.045) 
-0.105*     
(0.063) 
-0.064     
(0.049) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%. 
 
Of course, the migration decision could be potentially correlated with the outcomes 
under study. We exploit two alternative strategies to address this potential nuisance. Our 
first strategy takes advantage of the asynchronous timing in the titling process. The third 
column of Table 4 shows a significant difference in attrition for the parcels titled in 1989 
(early  treatment) relative to the control group. Instead, the last column shows no 
statistically significant differences in attrition for the parcels titled in 1998 (late treatment) 
                                                                  
15 To identify with accuracy the time of arrival of each family to the parcel they are currently 
occupying, our survey asked where the original squatter was living when Diego Maradona scored 
the ‘Hand of God’ goal in the 1986 World Cup game against England. It is impossible for an 
Argentine not to remember where she/he was on that day (Amis, 2004). 
16 For the families that arrived after 1985, our questionnaire attempted to collect information on 
the names and destination of the previous occupants of the parcels. In both treatment and control 
parcels, the current occupants could provide a name and/or destination of the previous occupant 
only for less than 20 percent of the cases. Although the information obtained is very poor, it does 
not suggest that the households that left the untitled parcels moved to richer areas than the 
families that left the titled parcels.   15 
relative to the control group. Thus, once we incorporate the fact that the analysis must 
be done on the survivors of the experiment, the non-intention-to-treat group appears a 
priori as a better control group for the late-treated group than for the early-treated 
squatters. First, there is no differential attrition between these two groups. Second, the 
unobservable variables that might have affected migration decisions are, a priori, more 
likely to be ignorable when comparing these two groups than when comparing the 
control and early treatment groups. This is so because these two groups not only faced 
similar shocks since they arrived to this neighborhood  –i.e. are in the same labor 
markets, etc.- but being untitled for most of the period, also had similar incentives to 
respond to them. Thus, the estimated effects of land titling for the group of recently titled 
parcels are unlikely to be biased by attrition. Additionally, the comparison of these 
coefficients with those corresponding to the estimated effects of land titling for the early- 
treated group leads to an indirect test of whether  attrition in the latter group is also 
ignorable.  
 
A more standard strategy to address the problem of attrition is to model the selection 
mechanism using latent index models (Heckman, 1979). A difficulty with this strategy, 
however, is that it needs to characterize the mean of the unobservable regression error 
term conditional on the regression covariates and the sample selection rule. An alternate 
approach is discussed in Ahn and Powell (1993). They propose to eliminate the 
selection bias by differencing o bservations with similar probabilities of selection 
sidestepping the problem of estimating the unknown conditional mean function.
17  The 
identification of the effects of land titling in the presence of sample selection requires that 
at least one of the pre-treatment characteristics predicts attrition. The idea is then to 
compare the outcomes for treated and control survivors with similar pre-treatment 
characteristics. This is equivalent to matching observations based on the propensity 
score of sample selection. 
 
The only pre-treatment characteristics available for the whole set of squatters (attrited 
and non-attrited) are the parcel characteristics reported in Table 2. We estimate a Logit 
model of the likelihood of survival since 1985 on these parcel characteristics, and find 
that a further distance to the nearby polluted and floodable creek significantly increases 
                                                                  
17 The strategy relies on the fact that in latent index models, the selected mean of the regression 
error is an invertible function of the probability of selection given covariates.    16 
this likelihood. We exploit the variability in attrition induced by this pre-treatment 
characteristic to correct for sample selection. 
 
We implement the matching selection correction by means of the method of stratification 
matching. First, we eliminate observations outside the common support of the estimated 
propensity score for the distributions of titled and untitled groups. Second, we divide the 
range of variation of the propensity score in intervals such that within each interval, 
treated and control units have on average the same propensity score. Third, within each 
interval, the difference between the average outcomes of the treated and the controls is 
computed. The parameter of interest is finally obtained as an average of the estimates of 




In this section we investigate the causal effect on housing investment, household 
structure, child education, access to credit, and labor earnings, of providing squatters 
with formal titles of the parcels of land they occupy. This is the treatment of interest in 
policy analysis in the developing world, where most interventions consist of titling 
occupied tracts of land to the current inhabitants.
18 
 
Ownership of property gives its owner multiple rights. In its most complete form, they 
include the rights to use the asset, to exclude others from using it, to transfer the assets 
to others, and to persist in these rights (Barzel, 1997). In our natural experiment, the 
entitled households acquired full property rights (with the only restriction that the parcels 
cannot be legally transferred for the first ten years after titling). The untitled households, 
instead, are still living in the occupied parcels without paying rent and property taxes, but 
they are uncertain about when and if the parcels will be titled. Moreover, the untitled may 
feel uncertain about which member of the household would receive the title, and they 
may fear the occupation of their parcels by new squatters before titling. In the meantime, 
the untitled cannot legally transfer their usufructuary rights. 
 
                                                                  
18 Whether the provision of land titles to squatters in this area could have encouraged new 
squatting (and therefore, violation o f landowners’ property rights) in other zones is beyond the 
scope of our study, but should not be ignored in the evaluation of the overall impact of this type of 
interventions.   17 
V.1. Effects on Housing Investment 
 
The possession of land titles may affect the incentives to invest in housing construction 
through several concurrent mechanisms. The traditional view emphasizes security from 
seizure. Individuals underinvest if others may seize the fruits of their investments. Land 
titles can also encourage investment by improving the transferability of the parcels. Even 
if there were no risk of expropriation, investments in untitled parcels would be highly 
illiquid, whereas titling reduces the cost of alienation of the assets. A third mechanism is 
through the credit market. Transferability might allow the use of the land as collateral, 
diminishing the funding constraints on investment. Finally, a fourth link is that land titles 
provide poor households with a valuable savings tool. Poor households, especially in 
unstable macroeconomic environments, lack appropriate savings instruments. Land titles 
allow households to substitute present consumption and leisure into long-term savings in 
real property.
19 We now investigate empirically the impact of legal land titles on housing 
investment. 
 
In Table 5 we summarize the analysis of the effect of property rights on housing 
investments. An important clarification is that before the occupation this was a wasteland 
area without any construction. Thus, the treatment and control areas had a similar (i.e., 
zero) baseline investment level before the occupation. In each column, we present the 
coefficient of the treatment dummy Property Right on a different housing characteristic. 
All the estimates reported in Table 5 are from regressions including controls for pre-









                                                                  
19 If households are constrained in the labor market opportunities, they can transform present 
leisure into long-term savings via self-made investments in their houses. Under no constraints, 
they could increase their labor market supply to pay for housing improvements. Most houses in 
this neighborhood are self-constructed (CEUR, 1984).   18 
Table 5 - Housing Investment 




















Property Right  0.20***  0.15**  8.27**  0.11**  8.42*** 
  (3.47)  (2.49)  (2.34)  (2.18)  (3.65) 
           
Control Group Mean  0.50  0.32  67.63  0.67  22.71 
%D  40.00%  46.87%  12.23%  16.42%  37.08% 
           
Notes: Good Walls, Good Roof, and Concrete Sidewalk are dummy variables that equal 1 if the house has 
walls of good quality, a roof of good quality, and a sidewalk made of concrete, respectively, and 0 
otherwise. Constructed surface is measured in squared meters. Overall Housing Quality measures the 
overall aspect of each house from 0 to 100 points. The parcel is the unit of observation. All the regressions 
control for parcel and original squatter pre-treatment characteristics: surface of the parcel; distance to 
creek; distance to nearest non-squatted area; block corner; age, gender, nationality, and years of 
education of the original squatter; and nationality and years of education of father and mother of the 
original squatter. The robustness of the results and detailed variable definitions are presented in Appendix 
Tables A.1 through A.5. Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses. ** Significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
 
The first two columns present large effects of land titling on the probability of having 
walls (first column) and roof (second column) of good quality. The proportion of houses 
with good quality walls rises by 40 percent under land titling, while the increase reaches 
47 percent for good quality roof. The third column presents the effect of land titling on 
the total surface constructed in the parcel. Our results suggest a statistically significant 
increase of about 12 percent in constructed surface under the presence of land titles. 
The fourth column shows a statistically significant increase of 16 percent in the 
proportion of houses with sidewalks made of concrete. In the last column, the variable 
Overall Housing Quality summarizes the overall aspect of each house using an index 
from 0 to 100 points assigned by the team of architects. The coefficient shows a large 
and significant effect of land titling on housing quality. Relative to the baseline average 
sample value, the estimated effect represents an overall housing improvement of 37 
percent associated to titling. 
 
For each one of these investment variables, in Appendix Tables A.1 to A.5 we show the 
robustness of the results regarding the methodological concerns discussed in section IV. 
In each Appendix table, Column (1) reports the model in Table 5, displaying all the 
coefficients (and t-statistics) for the control variables. In column (2), we start with a 
simple model without including any control variables. For the five outcome variables 
considered in Table 5, the point estimates are slightly lower than the ones obtained from   19 
the models that include the full set of control variables, but the differences are very small 
and never statistically significant. In Column (3) we add back the control variables for the 
parcel characteristics. Again, in all cases, the point estimates are very similar to those in 
Column (1). In Column (4) we add the observations for the San Martin neighborhood that 
were excluded from the baseline analysis in order to enhance geographical 
comparability between treatment and control groups (see Section III). Once more, the 
point estimates are similar to those in the baseline model in Column (1) and the 
differences are never statistically significant. 
 
Columns (5) and (6) address the potential presence of clusters in the errors of the 
models. There, we report t -statistics computed with clustered standard errors after 
clustering the parcels located in the same block and the parcels belonging to the same 
former owner. In most cases, t-statistics change little and the level of significance of the 
test remains unaltered. Only for concrete sidewalk, clustering the  standard errors 
noticeably reduces the significance of the treatment variable. 
 
Column (7) deals with the potential problem of non-compliance. We report 2SLS 
estimates instrumenting the Property Right dummy variable with the intention-to-treat 
variable Property Right Offer.
20 The estimates are very similar to those obtained from 
OLS in the baseline specification and the differences are not statistically significant at 
conventional levels. 
 
In Columns (8) and (9) we address the concern that these results might be generated by 
attrition in the original squatter population and are not the cause of treatment. As shown 
in Table 4, the attrition rates of the late-treated and control groups are not significantly 
different. In Column (8) we separately report the effects for early and late land titling and 
show that both treatments have positive significant effects on all the investment variables 
(but Concrete Sidewalk for the late treatment group). For all the variables, the point 
estimates for the late treatment coefficient are very similar to the ones in the baseline 
specification in Column (1). Moreover, the F-statistics show that we cannot reject the null 
hypotheses that the effects for the early-treated group and late-treated group are similar 
                                                                  
20 The first-stage regression is very strong. For the households that arrived before 1986 (i.e. the 
non-attrited group) and live in parcels offered for titling, the non-compliance rate is 11.2% (9.3% 
for the early treated, and 12% for the late treated).   20 
at conventional levels of significance.
21 Column (9) reports the stratified matching 
estimates discussed in the previous section. Again, for all the variables considered, the 
point estimates are quite similar to those in the baseline specification and the differences 
are never statistically significant. Thus, the evidence suggests that the estimates in 
Table 5 identify the causal effect of land titling on investment and not a statistical artifact 
due to attrition.  
 
Finally, in Column (10) we consider the whole sample of 448 parcels where households 
were interviewed, instead of considering only the parcels occupied by households that 
arrived before the time the former owners decided to surrender the land or sue. This 
analysis investigates a different parameter than the one considered so far. The 
estimated coefficient measures the causal effect of securing property rights on 
investment in a given parcel regardless of whether the selection of the family that is 
currently occupying it could have depended on titling status.
22 The estimated coefficients 
are of very similar magnitude. 
 
A final question relates to the interpretation of the identified causal effect of land titling on 
investment. Is this an incentive effect induced by owning formal property rights, or is it 
mainly a wealth effect from titled households that became richer, housing being a normal 
good? The evidence suggests the treatment operates by affecting the incentives to 
invest. First, the size of the wealth transfer was moderate (see footnote 3) and seems 
considerably smaller than the value of the constructed buildings.
23 Second, the families 
could not have financed the investments with the wealth transfer. It would be impossible 
to sell the land and, at the same time, invest the collected money on it. Moreover, access 
to credit improved little with titling (see section V.4). Third, Appendix Table 6 shows no 
differences in the consumption of durable goods (refrigerators, freezers, washing 
                                                                  
21 If one was still to worry about the possibility that the former owners’ decisions of accepting or 
disputing the government offer was correlated with land or squatter characteristics, the 
significance of the late-treatment coefficients and their similarity with the early-treatment ones 
should be reassuring. In both the late-treated and control areas, the squatters settled on 
eventually contested tracts of land and are, therefore, homogenous regarding the decisions of 
their respective original owners (see section II). 
22 In these regressions that ignore household attrition, the estimated coefficient can be interpreted 
as “what grows in a parcel when it is entitled” regardless of whether the same family has been 
occupying it or has been replaced by another one. Instead, the estimates obtained exclusively on 
the non-attrited households measure “what a given family builds in a parcel when receives a land 
title”.   21 
machines, TV sets and cellular phones). This suggests that the large investment effects 
presented in this section are a result of a change in the economic returns to housing 
investment induced by the land titles, and not just a response to a wealth effect that 
should have also affected the consumption of these goods. 
 
We conclude that moving a poor household from usufructuary rights to full property 
rights substantially improves housing quality. The estimated effects are large and robust, 
and seem to be the result of changes in the economic returns to housing investment 
induced by land titling. Thus, our micro evidence supports the hypothesis that securing 
property rights significantly increases investment levels.  
 
V.2. Effects on Household Size 
 
The possession of land titles may also affect the size and structure of households. There 
are several potential reasons for that to happen. Insurance motives seem to be the most 
important. The poor lack access to well-functioning insurance markets and pension 
systems that could protect them during bad times and retirement. With limited access to 
risk diversification, to savings instruments, and to the social security system, the need for 
insurance has to be satisfied by other means. A traditional provider of insurance among 
the poor is the extended family.
 Another possibility is to use children as future insurance. 
In particular, old-age security motives can induce higher fertility (see, among others, 
Cain, 1985, Nugent, 1985, Ray, 1997, and Portner, 2001).
24 By allowing the use of 
housing investment as a savings tool, by securing shelter for old age a nd by potentially 
improving the access to the credit market, land titling may provide some of the needed 
insurance, therefore reducing the demand for household members among the titled 
group.
25 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
23 For  areas of this level of development in the Buenos Aires outskirts, Zavalia Lagos (2005) 
estimates that the values of the constructed houses exceed the parcel values by five times. 
24 “[An] important question is whether having many children and/or a large extended household is 
an optimizing strategy allowing households to derive benefits otherwise lost d ue to poorly 
functioning markets” (Birdsall 1988, pp. 502).  
25 David and Sundstrom (1984) explain the fertility changes in US history using a similar 
argument. Suppose, they argue, that large families were designed to be old-age insurance for the 
parents. At the time of independence, the superabundance of arable land meant that the price of 
land would not rise over time sufficiently to be a nest egg for old age, and children would, or 
could, be induced to care for the aged parents. When, late in the nineteenth century, the best 
lands were growing scarce, then the rent, and therefore the price, of land already owned and 
settled would increase becoming a nest egg due to its capital gain. Thus, investment in land   22 
 
Moreover, the lack of land titles might reduce the ability of household heads to restrict 
their relatives from residing in their houses. The household heads may feel less powerful 
to expel or to deny access to members of their extended family when they lack formal 
titles. The lack of titles may also impede the division of wealth among family members, 
forcing claimants to live together to enjoy and retain  usufructuary rights. For example, 
siblings may end up having to live together if they cannot divide their inheritance upon 
the death of their untitled parents. In addition, untitled households may feel in need of 
increasing the number of family members in order to protect their houses from 
occupation by other squatters (Lanjouw and Levy, 2002; Field, 2003). Through these 
concurrent mechanisms, the lack of formal land titles may generate, on average, larger 
households among the untitled group. 
 
In Table 6, we find large differences in household size between titled and untitled 
families. Untitled families have an average of 6.06 members, while titled households 
have 0.95 members less. Table 6 also shows that the difference in household size does 
not originate in a more frequent presence in the control group of a spouse of the 
household head (column 2), nor of offspring of the household head older than 13 years 
old, i.e. born before the first land titles were issued (column 3). This last result is 
important, because it suggests that there were no differences in the number of children 
of the household head born before treatment.
26 
 
The difference in household size seems to originate in two factors. First, column (4) of 
Table 6 shows a higher presence (0.68 members) of non-nuclear relatives in untitled 
households. Untitled households report a much larger number of further relatives of the 
household head who are not her/his spouse or offspring (i.e., siblings, parents, in-laws, 
grandchildren, etc.) than entitled households.
27 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
operated as a substitute for more children. The scarcer the land, the higher the economic rent 
and capital gain, and the fewer children needed to provide for the declining years of the parents. 
26 The regression in column (3) only considers offspring living in the house. Non-significant 
differences are a lso obtained for the total number of household head’s offspring older than 13 
(i.e., living and not living in the parental home). 
27 The hypothesis that extended family members are valuable to protect the house from other 
squatters would suggest a larger share of males among non-nuclear adult members in the control 
group than in the treatment group. In our dataset, however, this proportion is smaller in the 
control group.   23 
Table 6 - Household Size 













(no Spouse or 
Offspring of HH) 
(4) 
Property Right  -0.95***  -0.01  -0.01  -0.68*** 
  (2.81)  (0.27)  (0.06)  (3.53) 
         
Control Group Mean  6.06  0.74  1.69  1.25 
%D Property Right  -15.68%  -1.35%  -0.59%  -54.40% 
 
  Offspring of the HH  
(5-13 years old) 
Offspring of the HH  
(0-4 years old) 
  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Property Right  -0.17    -0.07   
  (1.18)    (1.03)   
Property Right 1989    -0.38*    -0.08 
    (1.88)    (0.81) 
Property Right 1998    -0.06    -0.07 
    (0.37)    (0.86) 
         
Control Group Mean  1.06  1.06  0.33  0.33 
%D Property Right  -16.04%    -21.21%   
%D Property Right 1989    -35.85%    -24.24% 
%D Property Right 1998    -5.66%    -21.21% 
         
Notes: En each column, the dependent variable is the number of household members of each group. The 
household is the unit of observation. All the regressions control for parcel and original squatter pre-treatment 
characteristics: surface of the parcel; distance to creek; distance to nearest non-squatted area; block corner; 
age, gender, nationality, and years of education of the original squatter; and nationality and years of education 
of father and mother of the original squatter. The robustness of the results and detailed variable definitions are 
presented in Appendix Tables A.7 through A.12. Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses. * Significant 
at 10%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Second, the entitled households show a smaller number of offspring of the household 
head born after the title allocation. To better analyze this result, we split the household 
heads’ offspring into those born between the first and the second title allocation (children 
between 5 and 13 years old), and those born after the second title allocation (children 
between 0 and 4 years old). For the 5-13 age group, column (6) of Table 6 shows a 
significant reduction of 36% in the number of household heads’ children for the early-
treated households. This decrease corresponds to 8.5% of the sample average of total 
household heads’ offspring.
28 The effect, instead, is not significant for the late-treated 
                                                                  
28 This fertility effect does not depend on whether a woman or a man received the title. According 
to the expropriation law, the titles were awarded to both the household head and her/his spouse   24 
group. This result is reassuring,  since treatment could not have affected fertility for the 
late-treated group in the 5-13 age bracket as these children were born before titling for 
this group.
29 For the household heads’ children in the 0-4 age group, column (8) of Table 
6 shows that the effect, however, is not significant for both the late and early treated 
households. Still, in both cases the estimated coefficients correspond to a reduction in 
the number of offspring of more than 20%.
30 
 
The robustness of these results regarding the methodological concerns discussed in 
section IV is presented in Appendix Tables A.7 to A.12. Moreover, the results are robust 
to controlling for whether the original squatter is the current household head, for the age 
of the household head, and, in the regressions for the household heads’ children of 5-13 
and 0-4 years of age, for the number of offspring of the household head previously born. 
In summary, we find that entitled households are smaller than untitled ones. The larger 
size of households in the untitled parcels is due to both a larger number of offspring of 
the household head and a more frequent presence of non-nuclear relatives. 
 
V.3. Effects on School Performance 
 
The seminal work of Becker and Lewis (1973) advanced the presence of parental trade-
offs b etween the quantity and the quality of children. This trade-off appears because 
limited parents’ time and resources are spread over more children (see Rosenzweig and 
Wolpin (1980) and Hanushek (1992) for empirical evidence). If land titling causes a 
reduction in fertility, it could also induce households to increase educational investments 
in their children. Moreover, land titling may have beneficial effects on the education of 
household heads’ offspring through the reduction in the number of extended family 
members living in the house and the potential health consequences of improved housing 
(Goux and Maurin, 2005). 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
(if married or cohabitating). In our sample, 95.2 percent of the titled parcels include a woman as 
an owner or co-owner. 
29 For those results that should only be present for the early-treated group, we cannot exploit our 
early versus late titling strategy to rule out the possibility that the results are generated by 
attrition. In these cases, we only deal with the attrition concern using the matching estimators. 
30 A plausible explanation for the lack of significant effects on the number of household heads’ 
offspring of 0-4 years of age is that by 2003 our household heads were fairly old and, therefore, 
their fertility rate is low. Remember that three quarters of them were already the heads of their 
households at the time of the occupation (see footnote 10). In our sample, the average household   25 
 
We explore this hypothesis by looking at differences in educational outcomes. In Table 7 
we analyze the performance of children at school. We  collapse differences in school 
dropout, grade repetition, and age of school initiation, in the School Achievement 
variable, which is the difference between the school grade the child is currently attending 
or the maximum grade attained (if she/he is not currently attending school) minus the 
grade corresponding to her/his age. For the offspring of the household head in the 5-13 
age group in the early-treated households (the group of children for which in column (6) 
of Table 6 we found a reduction in the number of members), column (2) of Table 7 
shows a large effect on School Achievement.
31 The children in the control group show an 
average delay of 1.09 years in their school achievement, whereas this delay is 0.42 
years shorter for the children in the early-titled parcels. The effect is not significant for 
the children in the late-treated parcels, which had not shown a reduction in their number 
for this age group. 
Table 7 – Education 
Offspring of the Household Head (5-13 years old) 
  School Achievement  School Absenteeism 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Property Right  0.15    -0.39**   
  (1.28)    (2.43)   
Property Right 1989    0.42**    -0.55** 
    (2.20)    (2.12) 
Property Right 1998    0.05    -0.33* 
    (0.40)    (1.86) 
         
Control Group Mean  -1.09  -1.09  0.67  0.67 
         
Notes: In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is the difference between the school grade each child 
is currently attending or the maximum grade attained (if not attending school) minus the grade 
corresponding to the child age. In columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is the number of days the 
child missed school out of the last five days of classes. The child is the unit of observation.  All the 
regressions control for child age, child gender, and parcel and original squatter pre-treatment characteristics 
(surface of the parcel; distance to creek; distance to nearest non-squatted area; block corner; age, gender, 
nationality, and years of education of the original squatter; and nationality and years of education of father 
and mother of the original squatter). T he r obustness of the results and detailed variable definitions are 
presented in Appendix Tables A.13 and A.14. Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses. * Significant 
at 10%; ** significant at 5%. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
head age is 46 years old, and the average age of the female head (the household head if female 
or the age of his spouse if male) is 43.7 years old. 
31 Schooling is mandatory in Argentina since pre-school (age 5). Similar results are obtained if we 
limit the sample to children in the 6-13 age group. The regressions in Table 7 are estimated at the 
child level and include controls for child age and gender. I n addition to clustering the standard 
errors at the block and former owner levels, Appendix Tables A.13 and A.14 report standard 
errors clustered at the household level, together with the other robustness checks.   26 
 
How large is the effect of land titling on school achievement? In order to answer this 
question we need to establish a benchmark. Consider the successful Mexican anti-
poverty program Progresa, which provides monetary transfers to families that are 
contingent upon their children’s regular school attendance. The estimates in Behrman et 
al. (2005) indicate that if children were to participate in the program between their 6 to 14 
years of age, they would experience an increase of 0.6 years in average educational 
attainment levels, an effect comparable to the one we estimate for land titling for a 
similar age group. 
 
Finally, columns (3) and (4) of Table 7 show that, associated to titling status, there is a 
reduction of 0.4 days in the number of days children missed school out of the last five 
days of classes. In this case, the effect is present for both the early and late treated, 
suggesting that impacts on this variable could be more immediate. 
 
V.4. Effects on Performance in the Credit and Labor Markets 
 
Financial markets in developing countries are highly imperfect and these imperfections 
are particularly severe for the poor. The possession of formal property rights could allow 
the use of land as collateral, improving the access of the poor to the credit markets 
(Feder et al., 1988). In turn, this collateralized credit could be invested as capital, 
increasing labor productivity and income (De Soto, 2000). Moreover, land titling may 
have direct labor market effects if it relieves families from the need of leaving adults at 
home to protect their houses from occupation by other squatters (Field, 2003). We 
investigate whether land titles improve the performance of households in the credit and 
labor markets. 
 
In Table 8 we find no differences across groups in the access to credit cards and 
banking accounts; and to non-mortgage formal credit from banks, the government, labor 
unions or cooperatives. Indeed, these families show very little access to these types of 
formal credit. The access to credit is higher for informal credit from relatives, colleagues, 
neighbours, and friends, and for on-trust credit that families receive from the stores in 
which they perform their daily purchases. However, titling status shows no effect on 
access to these informal sources of credit.   27 
Table 8 - Access To Credit 
















Property Right  -0.01  0.01  -0.06  0.01 
  (0.71)  (0.19)  (1.00)  (0.16) 
         
Control Group Mean  0.05  0.09  0.41  0.27 
         
 
Mortgage Loan Received   
(5)  (6) 
Property Right  0.02   
  (1.58)   
Property Right 1989    0.04*** 
    (3.19) 
Property Right 1998    0.00 
    (0.06) 
     
Control Group Mean  0.00  0.00 
     
Notes: Credit Card & Bank Account is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the household head has a credit 
card or bank account, and 0 otherwise. Non-Mortgage Loan Received, Informal Credit, Grocery Store 
Credit, and Mortgage Loan Received are dummy variables that equal 1 if the household has received 
formal non-mortgage credit; informal credit from relatives, colleagues, neighbors or friends; on trust credit 
from grocery stores; and formal mortgage credit; respectively, and 0 otherwise. The household is the unit 
of observation. All the regressions control for parcel and original squatter pre-treatment characteristics: 
surface of the parcel; distance to creek; distance to nearest non-squatted area; block corner; age, gender, 
nationality, and years of education of the original squatter; and nationality and years of education of father 
and mother of the original squatter. The complete regressions and detailed variable definitions are 
presented in Appendix Table A.15. Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses. *** Significant at 1%. 
 
In the second panel of Table 8 we analyze the impact of titling on the access to 
mortgage loans. For this exercise, we separate the effect for the early and late treatment 
households. The late treatment group was not yet in a legal situation to mortgage the 
land at the time of the survey, as the  ten years established by the expropriation  law 
before allowing property transfers had not elapsed since the 1998 titling (see section II). 
In this case, we find a statistically significant effect of land titling on the access to 
mortgage markets. The control and the late-treated groups received no mortgages, 
whereas 4% of the early-treated households obtained these formal loans. 
 
Finally, we investigate the effect of land titling on labor market outcomes. For this 
exercise, a further advantage of our experiment is that treated and control households 
are all in the same labor market. In Table 9, we show no differences between control and   28 
treatment households in household head income, total household income, total 
household income per capita, total household income per adult, and employment status 
of the household head.
32 There are also no significant differences in the pension status 
of the household heads, in female employment, and in child labor.
33 In spite of land 
titling, these families are still very poor. Relative to the population of the Buenos Aires 
metropolitan area, the households in our sample show low income levels. Their average 
household income level is in the 25
th centile of the income distribution in the official 
household survey (EPH, May 2003), while their average per capita income is in the 14
th 
centile of the distribution. Moreover, their average household income amounts to only 
38% of the official poverty line, and 94% of the households are below this line.
34 
 
The modest effects of titling on the credit markets should not be too surprising. Previous 
evidence on the credit effects of land titling is ambiguous (see, among others, Feder et 
al., 1988; Place and Migot-Adholla, 1998; Carter and Olinto, 2002; Field and Torero, 
2003; and Calderon, 2004.  Also see Woodruff, 2001, for a critical review o f De Soto’s 
book). Real estate possession does not seem to be a sufficient condition for access to 
formal credit, which is largely restricted in Argentina to formal workers with requirements 
of minimum tenure in the current job and high wages.  Moreover, potential lenders 
probably evaluate that success in the legal eviction of households in these 
socioeconomic groups in the event of default is unlikely (Arrunada, 2003) and, if feasible, 
the cost of the legal process may exceed the market value of the parcels. Moreover, the 
                                                                  
32 Using cross-sectional data on past and future title recipients midway through a titling program 
in Peru, Field (2003) finds that land titles increase adult labor in the market. A serious concern 
with the validity of her findings, however, is that the program  timing across cities could be 
correlated with the outcomes of interest. For example, since the program first reached the main 
cities of the country, where the squatters migrated in order to be closer to the labor markets, her 
results showing that the already titled squatters display higher levels of work in the market than 
the untitled squatters (in both cases, relative to non-squatters in their respective areas), could be 
just an artifact of program timing bias. Note that this identification problem is not solved by 
including city effects in the model, which only control for average differences in employment 
across cities. A similar concern applies to potential biases from the order in which the program 
entered central and peripheral neighborhoods of each city. 
33 In our population, the frequency of child labor (for children 10-14 years old) is 0% in the 
treatment group, and 1.05% in the control group (the difference is not significant). These figures 
coincide with the negligible levels of child labor for the Buenos Aires metropolitan area (0.18% for 
the overall and 0.29% for the first income quintile according to the official household survey of 
May 2003). 
34 The results on the effects of land titling on the credit and labor markets remain unaltered when 
we perform all our robustness checks. For the sake of space, Appendix Tables A.15 and A.16 
only include the main specification and the early-late regression. The other specifications are 
available from the authors upon request.   29 
observed mortgage loans probably are not invested in business projects. The poor may 
lack good productive projects, or they may consider the land too valuable to be 
jeopardized in an entrepreneurial activity. Thus, the modest credit effects do not further 
translate into labor market differences.
35 
 
Table 9 - Labor Market 

























Property Right  -27.35  -43.56  1.04  -4.45  0.03 
  (1.10)  (1.27)  (0.13)  (0.38)  (0.63) 
           
Control Group Mean  272.54  374.59  73.72  118.73  0.73 
           
Notes: Household Head Income is the total income earned by the household head in the previous month. 
Total Household Income is the total income earned by all the household members in the previous month. 
Total Household Income per Capita is Total Household Income divided by the number of household 
members. Total Household Income per Adult is Total Household Income divided by the number of 
household members older than 16 years old. All income variables are measured in Argentine pesos. 
Employed Household Head is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the household head was employed the 
week before the survey, and 0 otherwise. The household is the unit of observation. All the regressions 
control for parcel and original squatter pre-treatment characteristics: surface of the parcel; distance to 
creek; distance to nearest non-squatted area; block corner; age, gender, nationality, and years of 
education of the original squatter; and nationality and years of education of father and mother of the 
original squatter. The complete regressions are presented in Appendix Table A.16. Absolute values of t 





Recently, land-titling programs have been advocated in policy circles as a powerful anti-
poverty instrument, and several countries in the developing world adopted or are in the 
process of adopting interventions to provide squatters with formal titles of the land they 
occupy. The main premise is that land titling could allow the poor to access the credit 
markets, transforming their wealth into capital and, hence,  increase their labor 
productivity and income. Rigorous evidence supporting these hypothesized effects is, 
however, scarce and ambiguous. Are land-titling programs an effective tool to rapidly 
reduce poverty? What are the effects of land titling? 
                                                                  
35 Our survey was performed during a severe macroeconomic recession. We cannot exclude the 
possibility that land titling shows labor market effects in more benign times.   30 
 
Identifying the causal effects of land titling is difficult because the allocation of property 
rights across households is not random, but typically endogenous in equations 
describing the outcomes under study. Previous work exploited standard exclusion 
restrictions or variability in the timing of policy interventions to deal with this selection 
problem. In this paper, instead, we exploit a natural experiment in the allocation of land 
titles across squatters in a poor suburban area of Buenos Aires, Argentina. We believe 
that our strategy credibly identifies the effect of land titling:  untitled and entitled 
households were extremely similar before titling, the parcels they inhabit are identical, 
and the allocation of property rights did not depend on the characteristics of the 
squatters.   
 
We only find a modest but positive effect of land titling on access to mortgage credit, and 
no impact on access to other forms of credit. Moreover, we do not find any effect on the 
labor income of the treated households. Should we therefore conclude that entitling the 
urban poor renders them little progress? Not necessarily. We showed that moving a poor 
household from usufructuary land rights to full property rights substantially increased 
investment in the houses.  Moreover, land titling  reduced the fertility of the household 
heads (especially when treated being young), a nd the presence of extended family 
members. Also, these smaller families invested more in the education of their children. In 
sum, entitling the poor increases their investment both in the house and in the human 
capital of their children, which will contribute to reduce the poverty of the next 
generation.   31 
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Appendix Table A.1 - GOOD WALLS 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Property Right  0.20***  0.19***  0.19***  0.14***  0.20***  0.20***  0.18***    0.21***  0.11** 
  (3.47)  (3.32)  (3.37)  (2.65)  (3.18)  (4.20)  (2.62)    (3.34)  (2.35) 
Property Right 1989                0.23***     
                (2.77)     
Property Right 1998                0.19***     
                (2.90)     
Parcel Surface  -0.00***    -0.00***  -0.00**  -0.00**  -0.00***  -0.00***  -0.00***    -0.00** 
  (2.69)    (2.65)  (2.19)  (2.23)  (4.15)  (2.74)  (2.70)    (2.44) 
Distance to Creek  0.07**    0.07**  0.02  0.07**  0.07***  0.07**  0.07**    0.08*** 
  (2.31)    (2.29)  (0.88)  (2.47)  (2.99)  (2.21)  (2.11)    (3.27) 
Block Corner  -0.06    -0.09  -0.01  -0.06  -0.06  -0.06  -0.06    -0.09 
  (0.66)    (1.15)  (0.17)  (0.68)  (0.83)  (0.71)  (0.67)    (1.28) 
Distance to Non-Squatted   0.03    0.04  0.05*  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03    0.02 
Area  (0.97)    (1.49)  (1.80)  (0.84)  (1.65)  (0.96)  (0.97)    (0.89) 
Age of Original Squatter<50  0.01      -0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01     
  (0.18)      (0.47)  (0.18)  (0.32)  (0.16)  (0.16)     
Female Original Squatter  0.05      -0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05     
  (0.81)      (0.99)  (0.82)  (0.80)  (0.81)  (0.81)     
Argentine Original Squatter  -0.16      -0.12  -0.16  -0.16  -0.17  -0.16     
  (1.12)      (0.95)  (1.23)  (1.24)  (1.16)  (1.13)     
Years of Education of the   -0.02      -0.01  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02     
Original Squatter  (1.03)      (0.60)  (0.98)  (1.37)  (1.02)  (1.04)     
Argentine Father of the   -0.23**      -0.16  -0.23**  -0.23***  -0.23**  -0.23**     
Original Squatter  (2.03)      (1.52)  (2.59)  (3.53)  (1.99)  (2.01)     
Years of Education of   0.02      -0.01  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02     
Original Squatter’s Father  (0.60)      (0.35)  (0.66)  (0.78)  (0.55)  (0.61)     
Argentine Mother of the   0.27**      0.15  0.27**  0.27  0.27**  0.27**     
Original Squatter  (2.38)      (1.42)  (2.18)  (1.49)  (2.41)  (2.36)     
Years of Education of   0.00      0.03  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00     
Original Squatter’s Mother  (0.08)      (0.96)  (0.08)  (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.07)     
Constant  0.71***  0.50***  0.58***  0.66***  0.71**  0.71***  0.73***  0.72***    0.57*** 
  (3.09)  (11.92)  (3.81)  (3.54)  (2.49)  (4.54)  (3.18)  (3.11)    (4.78) 
F-stat                0.16     
Observations  295  295  295  403  295  295  295  295  273  441 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy  that equals 1 if the house has walls of good quality (brick, stone, block or concrete with exterior siding), and 0 
otherwise. The parcel is the unit of observation. Column (1) is summarized in Column 1 of Table 5. Column (2) includes no controls, and Column (3) only controls 
for parcel characteristics. Column (4) adds the observations for the San Martin neighborhood. The standard errors are clustered at the block level in Column (5), 
and at the former owner level in Column (6). The 2SLS regression (instrumenting the treatment variable “Property Right” with the intention-to-treat variable 
“Property Right Offer”) is presented in Column (7). Column (8) shows separately the effect of early and late treatments. The F-stat tests the null hypothesis: 
Property Right 1989 = Property Right 1998. Column (9) presents the matching estimate using the propensity score of the probability of attrition (standard errors are 
bootstrapped using 100 replications). The regression in Column (10) is estimated on all the interviewed households (for any time of household arrival). Parcel 
Surface is measured in squared meters. Distance to Creek and Distance to Non-Squatted Area are measured in blocks. For deceased original squatters, the age 
was calculated from year of death and age at death. We use (non-reported) dummies for missing data on original squatter’s age, and original squatter parents’ 
nationality and years of education (a total of ten observations). Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%. 






Appendix Table A.2 - GOOD ROOF 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Property Right  0.15**  0.14**  0.15***  0.14***  0.15**  0.15**  0.16**    0.12*  0.12** 
  (2.49)  (2.41)  (2.65)  (2.67)  (2.26)  (2.68)  (2.22)    (1.66)  (2.55) 
Property Right 1989                0.22***     
                (2.63)     
Property Right 1998                0.11*     
                (1.66)     
Parcel Surface  0.00    0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00    0.00 
  (0.42)    (0.46)  (1.45)  (0.36)  (0.24)  (0.43)  (0.38)    (0.98) 
Distance to Creek  0.03    0.03  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.02    0.03 
  (0.94)    (1.00)  (0.75)  (0.84)  (1.31)  (0.95)  (0.55)    (1.07) 
Block Corner  0.08    0.08  0.12  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08    0.02 
  (0.91)    (1.02)  (1.60)  (0.94)  (0.68)  (0.91)  (0.91)    (0.26) 
Distance to Non-Squatted  -0.01    -0.02  -0.02  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01    -0.01 
Area  (0.31)    (0.60)  (0.56)  (0.31)  (0.54)  (0.31)  (0.31)    (0.58) 
Age of Original Squatter<50  -0.01      0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01     
  (0.13)      (0.11)  (0.14)  (0.23)  (0.13)  (0.20)     
Female Original Squatter  -0.04      -0.04  -0.04  -0.04  -0.04  -0.04     
  (0.64)      (0.73)  (0.65)  (1.20)  (0.64)  (0.65)     
Argentine Original Squatter  0.18      0.13  0.18  0.18  0.18  0.17     
  (1.21)      (0.98)  (1.13)  (1.38)  (1.21)  (1.15)     
Years of Education of the   0.00      0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00     
Original Squatter  (0.22)      (0.50)  (0.21)  (0.13)  (0.22)  (0.19)     
Argentine Father of the   -0.02      0.05  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.01     
Original Squatter  (0.15)      (0.47)  (0.14)  (0.21)  (0.16)  (0.11)     
Years of Education of   -0.00      -0.01  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  0.00     
Original Squatter’s Father  (0.03)      (0.51)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.00)     
Argentine Mother of the   -0.09      -0.11  -0.09  -0.09  -0.09  -0.09     
Original Squatter  (0.73)      (1.02)  (0.62)  (0.62)  (0.74)  (0.78)     
Years of Education of   0.00      0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00     
Original Squatter’s Mother  (0.17)      (0.19)  (0.18)  (0.26)  (0.16)  (0.14)     
Constant  0.12  0.32***  0.22  0.12  0.12  0.12  0.12  0.16    0.22* 
  (0.52)  (7.53)  (1.41)  (0.63)  (0.50)  (0.44)  (0.49)  (0.69)    (1.85) 
F-stat                1.48     
Observations  297  297  297  405  297  297  297  297  276  445 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if the house has a roof of good quality (asphalt shingle, membrane, tile, slab, slate or clay roof tile), and 0 
otherwise. The parcel is the unit of obs ervation. Column (1) is summarized in Column 2 of Table 5. Column (2) includes no controls, and Column (3) only controls 
for parcel characteristics. Column (4) adds the observations for the San Martin neighborhood. The standard errors are clustered at the block level in Column (5), 
and at the former owner level in Column (6). The 2SLS regression (instrumenting the treatment variable “Property Right” with the intention-to-treat variable 
“Property Right Offer”) is presented in Column (7). Column (8) shows separately the effect of early and late treatments. The F-stat tests the null hypothesis: 
Property Right 1989 = Property Right 1998. Column (9) presents the matching estimate using the propensity score of the probability of attrition (standard errors 
are bootstrapped using 100 replications). The regression in Column (10) is estimated on all the interviewed households (for any time of household arrival). The 
control variables are described in Appendix Table A.1. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 






Appendix Table A.3 - CONSTRUCTED SURFACE 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Property Right  8.27**  7.99**  9.89***  5.30*  8.27**  8.27  9.87**    8.55**  8.61*** 
  (2.34)  (2.33)  (2.87)  (1.68)  (2.15)  (1.44)  (2.41)    (2.18)  (3.02) 
Property Right 1989                10.34**     
                (2.09)     
Property Right 1998                7.18*     
                (1.80)     
Parcel Surface  -0.01    -0.00  0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01    0.01 
  (0.36)    (0.02)  (0.63)  (0.37)  (0.35)  (0.31)  (0.37)    (0.68) 
Distance to Creek  5.90***    6.42***  2.63**  5.90***  5.90***  6.07***  5.54***    4.80*** 
  (3.03)    (3.42)  (2.09)  (3.11)  (3.06)  (3.10)  (2.73)    (3.15) 
Block Corner  4.38    3.98  3.03  4.38  4.38  4.57  4.39    8.37** 
  (0.87)    (0.82)  (0.67)  (0.77)  (1.59)  (0.91)  (0.87)    (2.10) 
Distance to Non-Squatted   3.67**    4.51***  3.05*  3.67  3.67  3.69**  3.67**    2.02 
Area  (2.06)    (2.60)  (1.93)  (1.60)  (1.43)  (2.07)  (2.06)    (1.36) 
Age of Original Squatter<50  -1.68      -2.63  -1.68  -1.68  -1.59  -1.80     
  (0.48)      (0.88)  (0.51)  (0.51)  (0.45)  (0.51)     
Female Original Squatter  -0.70      -1.99  -0.70  -0.70  -0.69  -0.73     
  (0.20)      (0.66)  (0.21)  (0.23)  (0.19)  (0.20)     
Argentine Original Squatter  -7.54      -8.07  -7.54  -7.54  -7.18  -7.76     
  (0.87)      (1.07)  (0.85)  (1.48)  (0.83)  (0.90)     
Years of Education of the   -0.08      -0.14  -0.08  -0.08  -0.09  -0.09     
Original Squatter  (0.08)      (0.17)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.09)  (0.09)     
Argentine Father of the   -5.45      -2.43  -5.45  -5.45  -5.68  -5.28     
Original Squatter  (0.79)      (0.39)  (0.83)  (1.14)  (0.83)  (0.77)     
Years of Education of   -3.31**      -3.22**  -3.31**  -3.31*  -3.24**  -3.29**     
Original Squatter’s Father  (2.06)      (2.38)  (2.21)  (1.89)  (2.01)  (2.04)     
Argentine Mother of the   10.73      8.19  10.73  10.73***  10.54  10.51     
Original Squatter  (1.55)      (1.28)  (1.27)  (3.04)  (1.53)  (1.52)     
Years of Education of   3.59**      3.58**  3.59*  3.59*  3.54**  3.57**     
Original Squatter’s Mother  (2.10)      (2.28)  (1.68)  (1.78)  (2.06)  (2.08)     
Constant  54.32***  67.63***  46.28***  58.62***  54.32***  54.32***  52.66***  55.53***    49.97*** 
  (3.98)  (26.49)  (5.00)  (5.32)  (3.39)  (4.32)  (3.81)  (4.02)    (6.78) 
F-stat                0.36     
Observations  299  299  299  407  299  299  299  299  277  447 
Notes: The dependent variable is the constructed surface in squared meters. The parcel is the unit of observation. Column (1) is summarized in Column 3 of Table 
5. Column (2) includes no controls, and Column (3) only controls for parcel characteristics. Column (4) adds the observations for the San Martin neighborhood. The 
standard errors are clustered at the block level in Column (5), and at the former owner level in Column (6). The 2SLS regression (instrumenting the treatment 
variable “Property Right” with the intention-to-treat variable “Property Right Offer”) is presented in Column (7). Column (8) shows separately the effect of early and 
late treatments. The F-stat tests the null hypothesis: Property Right 1989 = Property Right 1998. Column (9) presents the matching estimate using the propensity 
score of the probability of attrition (standard errors are bootstrapped using 100 replications). The regression in Column (10) is estimated on all the interviewed 
households (for any time of household arrival). The control variables are described in Appendix Table A.1. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * Significant 
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 





Appendix Table A.4 - CONCRETE SIDEWALK 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Property Right  0.11**  0.08  0.12**  0.10**  0.11  0.11  0.10    0.08  0.16*** 
  (2.18)  (1.43)  (2.24)  (2.41)  (1.60)  (1.55)  (1.63)    (1.42)  (3.85) 
Property Right 1989                0.16**     
                (2.14)     
Property Right 1998                0.09     
                (1.55)     
Parcel Surface  -0.00    -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00    -0.00 
  (0.44)    (0.69)  (0.51)  (0.40)  (0.24)  (0.47)  (0.46)    (1.15) 
Distance to Creek  0.09***    0.09***  0.08***  0.09**  0.09**  0.09***  0.09***    0.11*** 
  (3.29)    (3.19)  (4.64)  (2.40)  (2.25)  (3.22)  (2.90)    (4.89) 
Block Corner  -0.12    -0.14**  -0.13**  -0.12  -0.12*  -0.12  -0.12    -0.08 
  (1.57)    (1.98)  (2.17)  (1.65)  (2.01)  (1.59)  (1.57)    (1.29) 
Distance to Non-Squatted   -0.07**    -0.07***  -0.05**  -0.07*  -0.07  -0.07**  -0.07**    -0.09*** 
Area  (2.49)    (2.66)  (2.27)  (1.68)  (1.69)  (2.49)  (2.49)    (4.14) 
Age of Original Squatter<50  -0.10*      -0.07*  -0.10**  -0.10*  -0.10*  -0.10*     
  (1.92)      (1.78)  (2.03)  (2.09)  (1.94)  (1.97)     
Female Original Squatter  -0.05      -0.06  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05     
  (0.95)      (1.54)  (0.90)  (1.45)  (0.96)  (0.97)     
Argentine Original Squatter  0.06      0.05  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.06     
  (0.50)      (0.47)  (0.41)  (0.74)  (0.48)  (0.47)     
Years of Education of the   -0.02      -0.02  -0.02*  -0.02**  -0.02  -0.02     
Original Squatter  (1.44)      (1.50)  (1.81)  (2.75)  (1.43)  (1.46)     
Argentine Father of the   -0.03      -0.02  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03     
Original Squatter  (0.34)      (0.19)  (0.40)  (0.32)  (0.32)  (0.30)     
Years of Education of   0.03      0.03  0.03  0.03*  0.03  0.03     
Original Squatter’s Father  (1.37)      (1.48)  (1.55)  (1.74)  (1.34)  (1.39)     
Argentine Mother of the   -0.02      -0.03  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.03     
Original Squatter  (0.21)      (0.34)  (0.15)  (0.23)  (0.19)  (0.25)     
Years of Education of   -0.03      -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03     
Original Squatter’s Mother  (1.15)      (1.35)  (1.11)  (0.99)  (1.14)  (1.17)     
Constant  0.84***  0.67***  0.71***  0.81***  0.84***  0.84**  0.85***  0.86***    0.68*** 
  (4.10)  (17.19)  (5.17)  (5.54)  (3.27)  (2.26)  (4.13)  (4.18)    (6.34) 
F-stat                0.71     
Observations  300  300  300  408  300  300  300  300  278  448 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy  that equals 1 if the house has a sidewalk made of concrete, and 0 otherwise. The parcel is the unit of observation. 
Column (1) is summarized in Column 4 of Table 5. Column (2) includes no controls, and Column (3) only controls for parcel characteristics. Column (4) adds the 
observations for the San Martin neighborhood. The standard errors are clustered at the block level in Column (5), and at the former owner level in Column (6). The 
2SLS regression (instrumenting the treatment variable “Property Right” with the intention-to-treat variable “Property Right Offer”) is presented in Column (7). 
Column (8) shows separately the effect of early and late treatments. The F-stat tests the null hypothesis: Property Right 1989 = Property Right 1998. Column (9) 
presents the matching estimate using the propensity score of the probability of attrition (standard errors are bootstrapped using 100 replications). The regression 
in Column (10) is estimated on all the interviewed households (for any time of household arrival). The control variables are described in Appendix Table A.1. 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 





Appendix Table A.5 – OVERALL HOUSING QUALITY 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Property Right  8.42***  7.45***  8.07***  5.39***  8.42***  8.42***  10.17***    8.23***  8.07*** 
  (3.65)  (3.38)  (3.58)  (2.67)  (3.91)  (2.98)  (3.80)    (3.63)  (3.58) 
Property Right 1989                6.27*     
                (1.95)     
Property Right 1998                9.54***     
                (3.68)     
Parcel Surface  -0.02    -0.02  -0.00  -0.02  -0.02*  -0.02  -0.02    -0.02 
  (1.28)    (1.46)  (0.47)  (1.49)  (2.00)  (1.19)  (1.25)    (1.46) 
Distance to Creek  2.47*    2.32*  -0.26  2.47*  2.47**  2.66**  2.83**    2.32* 
  (1.95)    (1.90)  (0.32)  (1.85)  (2.88)  (2.08)  (2.14)    (1.90) 
Block Corner  0.13    -0.70  1.94  0.13  0.13  0.34  0.13    -0.70 
  (0.04)    (0.22)  (0.68)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.10)  (0.04)    (0.22) 
Distance to Non-Squatted Area  -0.00    -0.14  -0.19  -0.00  -0.00  0.02  -0.01    -0.14 
  (0.00)    (0.13)  (0.18)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.01)    (0.13) 
Age of Original Squatter<50  0.61      0.12  0.61  0.61  0.71  0.73     
  (0.26)      (0.06)  (0.31)  (0.43)  (0.31)  (0.32)     
Female Original Squatter  -3.21      -3.98**  -3.21  -3.21  -3.20  -3.18     
  (1.39)      (2.08)  (1.46)  (1.71)  (1.38)  (1.37)     
Argentine Original Squatter  6.82      2.65  6.82  6.82**  7.22  7.04     
  (1.21)      (0.55)  (0.95)  (2.33)  (1.28)  (1.25)     
Years of Education of the   0.70      0.48  0.70  0.70  0.69  0.72     
Original Squatter  (1.08)      (0.93)  (0.88)  (0.73)  (1.06)  (1.11)     
Argentine Father of the   -9.82**      -5.85  -9.82**  -9.82**  -10.07**  -9.99**     
Original Squatter  (2.19)      (1.45)  (2.20)  (2.40)  (2.25)  (2.23)     
Years of Education of   -1.13      -0.65  -1.13  -1.13**  -1.05  -1.16     
Original Squatter’s Father  (1.08)      (0.75)  (1.37)  (2.17)  (1.00)  (1.10)     
Argentine Mother of the   -1.94      -1.18  -1.94  -1.94  -2.14  -1.71     
Original Squatter  (0.43)      (0.29)  (0.33)  (0.45)  (0.47)  (0.38)     
Years of Education of   -1.22      -0.81  -1.22  -1.22  -1.28  -1.19     
Original Squatter’s Mother  (1.09)      (0.81)  (1.00)  (0.97)  (1.14)  (1.07)     
Constant  34.15***  22.71***  24.63***  33.20***  34.15***  34.15***  32.33***  32.89***    24.63*** 
  (3.84)  (13.82)  (4.08)  (4.72)  (3.71)  (3.89)  (3.58)  (3.66)    (4.08) 
F-stat                0.91     
Observations  299  299  299  407  299  299  299  299  277  299 
Notes: The dependent variable measures the overall aspect of each house from 0 to 100 points assigned by the team of architects assuming 0 for the worst 
dwelling in a shanty town of Solano and 100 for a middle-class house in downtown Quilmes (the main locality of the county). Similar results are obtained using an 
alternative index of housing quality that measures the overall aspect of each house from 0 to 100 points assuming 0 for the worst and 100 for the best houses within 
this neighborhood. The parcel is the unit of observation. Column (1) is summarized in Column 5 of Table 5. Column (2) includes no controls, and Column (3) only 
controls for parcel characteristics. Column (4) adds the observations for the San Martin neighborhood. The standard errors are clustered at the block level in 
Column (5), and at the former owner level in Column (6). The 2SLS regression (instrumenting the treatment variable “Property Right” with the intention-to-treat 
variable “Property Right Offer”) is presented in Column (7). Column (8) shows separately the effect of early and late treatments. The F-stat tests the null hypothesis: 
Property Right 1989 = Property Right 1998. Column (9) presents the matching estimate using the propensity score of the probability of attrition (standard errors are 
bootstrapped using 100 replications). The regression in Column (10) is estimated on all the interviewed households (for any time of household arrival). The control 
variables are described in Appendix Table A.1. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 








Appendix Table A.6 - DURABLE CONSUMPTION 















Property Right  0.05  0.04  0.04  -0.01  -0.01 
  (0.92)  (0.61)  (0.67)  (0.40)  (0.32) 
Parcel Surface  -0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.00  0.00 
  (1.28)  (0.82)  (0.39)  (0.44)  (0.98) 
Distance to Creek  0.09***  -0.03  0.06**  0.06***  0.03* 
  (2.98)  (0.83)  (2.11)  (3.12)  (1.88) 
Block Corner  -0.04  0.09  0.05  0.03  0.02 
  (0.47)  (1.05)  (0.56)  (0.67)  (0.57) 
Distance to Non-Squatted Area  -0.01  0.02  0.06**  0.02  0.00 
  (0.28)  (0.80)  (2.04)  (0.95)  (0.31) 
Age of Original Squatter<50  0.03  -0.01  0.02  0.01  -0.01 
  (0.58)  (0.20)  (0.32)  (0.38)  (0.32) 
Female Original Squatter  0.02  -0.04  -0.05  0.03  0.00 
  (0.35)  (0.74)  (0.86)  (1.04)  (0.20) 
Argentine Original Squatter  0.05  -0.06  -0.02  -0.22***  -0.01 
  (0.37)  (0.37)  (0.14)  (2.67)  (0.22) 
Years of Education of the   0.02  -0.02  0.02  0.01  -0.00 
Original Squatter  (1.02)  (1.29)  (1.30)  (1.55)  (0.64) 
Argentine Father of the   -0.10  0.05  -0.04  0.06  0.04 
Original Squatter  (0.87)  (0.43)  (0.39)  (0.90)  (0.90) 
Years of Education of   0.01  0.01  -0.01  -0.00  0.02* 
Original Squatter’s Father  (0.21)  (0.18)  (0.54)  (0.14)  (1.91) 
Argentine Mother of the   -0.03  0.06  -0.07  0.08  -0.02 
Original Squatter  (0.30)  (0.50)  (0.62)  (1.18)  (0.49) 
Years of Education of   0.01  -0.01  -0.05*  -0.01  -0.02** 
Original Squatter’s Mother  (0.35)  (0.38)  (1.77)  (0.82)  (2.06) 
Constant  0.19  0.55**  0.66***  0.85***  -0.01 
  (0.86)  (2.33)  (3.02)  (6.64)  (0.12) 
Observations  311  311  311  312  312 
Notes: The dependent variable of each column is a dummy that equals 1 if the household possesses the good, and 0 otherwise. The household is the unit of 
observation. The control variables are described in Appendix Table A.1. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 






Appendix Table A.7 – NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Property Right  -0.95***  -0.87***  -0.86**  -0.92***  -0.95**  -0.95**  -1.19***    -0.87** 
  (2.81)  (2.66)  (2.55)  (3.06)  (2.55)  (2.76)  (3.02)    (2.33) 
Property Right 1989                -1.18**   
                (2.50)   
Property Right 1998                -0.82**   
                (2.16)   
Parcel Surface  0.00    0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00   
  (0.58)    (0.68)  (0.86)  (0.61)  (1.12)  (0.51)  (0.60)   
Distance to Creek  0.03    -0.04  0.08  0.03  0.03  0.01  0.07   
  (0.19)    (0.20)  (0.66)  (0.19)  (0.21)  (0.05)  (0.39)   
Block Corner  -0.05    0.05  0.03  -0.05  -0.05  -0.07  -0.05   
  (0.10)    (0.10)  (0.06)  (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.15)  (0.10)   
Distance to Non-Squatted   0.03    -0.02  0.10  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03   
Area  (0.17)    (0.11)  (0.64)  (0.17)  (0.19)  (0.16)  (0.17)   
Age of Original Squatter<50  1.04***      0.77***  1.04***  1.04***  1.02***  1.05***   
  (3.08)      (2.70)  (3.04)  (3.86)  (3.02)  (3.11)   
Female Original Squatter  -0.09      -0.09  -0.09  -0.09  -0.09  -0.08   
  (0.25)      (0.32)  (0.24)  (0.18)  (0.27)  (0.25)   
Argentine Original Squatter  -0.90      -0.69  -0.90  -0.90  -0.96  -0.87   
  (1.07)      (0.95)  (1.15)  (1.16)  (1.14)  (1.04)   
Years of Education of the   -0.08      -0.11  -0.08  -0.08  -0.07  -0.07   
Original Squatter  (0.79)      (1.49)  (0.78)  (0.54)  (0.77)  (0.76)   
Argentine Father of the   1.24*      1.09*  1.24*  1.24*  1.27*  1.22*   
Original Squatter  (1.85)      (1.77)  (1.78)  (1.92)  (1.89)  (1.82)   
Years of Education of   -0.18      -0.17  -0.18  -0.18  -0.19  -0.18   
Original Squatter’s Father  (1.15)      (1.35)  (1.23)  (1.30)  (1.21)  (1.16)   
Argentine Mother of the   -0.75      -0.59  -0.75  -0.75  -0.73  -0.73   
Original Squatter  (1.11)      (0.95)  (1.06)  (1.48)  (1.08)  (1.07)   
Years of Education of   0.07      0.04  0.07  0.07  0.08  0.07   
Original Squatter’s Mother  (0.43)      (0.29)  (0.48)  (0.46)  (0.47)  (0.45)   
Constant  6.41***  6.06***  5.72***  6.52***  6.41***  6.41***  6.67***  6.26***   
  (4.89)  (24.97)  (6.34)  (6.17)  (5.51)  (6.74)  (5.02)  (4.71)   
F-stat                0.51   
Observations  313  313  313  425  313  313  313  313  290 
Notes: The dependent variable is the total number of household members. The household is the unit of observation. Column (1) is summarized in Column 1 of 
Table 6. Column (2) includes no controls, and Column (3) only controls for parcel characteristics. Column (4) adds the observations for the San Martin 
neighborhood. The standard errors are clustered at the block level in Column (5), and at the former owner level in Column (6). The 2SLS regression 
(instrumenting the treatment variable “Property Right” with the intention-to-treat variable “Property Right Offer”) is presented in Column (7). Column (8) shows 
separately the effect of early and late treatments. The F-stat tests the n ull hypothesis: Property Right 1989 = Property Right 1998. Column (9) presents the 
matching estimate using the propensity score of the probability of attrition (standard errors are bootstrapped using 100 replications). The control variables are 
described in Appendix Table A.1. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 






Appendix Table A.8 – HOUSEHOLD HEAD SPOUSE 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Property Right  -0.01  -0.02  -0.02  -0.03  -0.01  -0.01  0.01    -0.05 
  (0.27)  (0.37)  (0.37)  (0.56)  (0.26)  (0.41)  (0.20)    (0.70) 
Property Right 1989                -0.03   
                (0.36)   
Property Right 1998                -0.01   
                (0.13)   
Parcel Surface  -0.00    -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00   
  (0.94)    (1.45)  (0.86)  (0.98)  (1.53)  (0.89)  (0.93)   
Distance to Creek  0.02    0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02   
  (0.67)    (0.47)  (0.73)  (0.70)  (0.58)  (0.75)  (0.70)   
Block Corner  0.03    0.06  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03   
  (0.41)    (0.84)  (0.44)  (0.44)  (0.45)  (0.45)  (0.41)   
Distance to Non-Squatted  0.01    0.00  0.03  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01   
Area  (0.37)    (0.03)  (1.22)  (0.36)  (0.39)  (0.37)  (0.37)   
Age of Original Squatter<50  0.03      0.04  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03   
  (0.56)      (1.02)  (0.47)  (0.57)  (0.59)  (0.57)   
Female Original Squatter  -0.28***      -0.31***  -0.28***  -0.28***  -0.28***  -0.28***   
  (5.41)      (7.20)  (4.82)  (4.66)  (5.39)  (5.40)   
Argentine Original Squatter  -0.01      0.01  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  -0.00   
  (0.05)      (0.14)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.00)  (0.04)   
Years of Education of the   0.02*      0.01  0.02*  0.02**  0.02*  0.02*   
Original Squatter  (1.71)      (1.02)  (1.77)  (2.22)  (1.71)  (1.72)   
Argentine Father of the   -0.05      -0.02  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05   
Original Squatter  (0.45)      (0.24)  (0.55)  (0.77)  (0.48)  (0.45)   
Years of Education of   0.00      0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00   
Original Squatter’s Father  (0.03)      (0.85)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.07)  (0.02)   
Argentine Mother of the   -0.06      -0.09  -0.06  -0.06  -0.06  -0.06   
Original Squatter  (0.58)      (0.93)  (0.63)  (0.53)  (0.60)  (0.56)   
Years of Education of   -0.02      0.00  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02   
Original Squatter’s Mother  (0.81)      (0.12)  (0.64)  (0.85)  (0.83)  (0.80)   
Constant  0.89***  0.74***  0.84***  0.73***  0.89***  0.89***  0.86***  0.88***   
  (4.46)  (19.44)  (6.01)  (4.59)  (5.25)  (9.38)  (4.27)  (4.36)   
F-stat                0.06   
Observations  313  313  313  425  313  313  313  313  290 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy  that equals 1 if the household head lives with a spouse, and 0 otherwise. The household is the unit of observation. 
Column (1) is summarized in Column 2 of Table 6. Column (2) includes no controls, and Column (3) only controls for parcel characteristics. Column (4) adds the 
observations for the San Martin neighborhood. The standard errors are clustered at the block level in Column (5), and at the former owner level in Column (6). 
The 2SLS regression (instrumenting the treatment variable “Property Right” with the intention-to-treat variable “Property Right Offer”) is presented in Column (7). 
Column (8) shows separately the effect of early and late treatments. The F-stat tests the null hypothesis: Property Right 1989 = Property Right 1998. Column (9) 
presents the matching estimate  using the propensity score of the probability of attrition (standard errors are bootstrapped using 100 replications). The control 
variables are described in Appendix Table A.1. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 






Appendix Table A.9 – NUMBER OF OFFSPRING OF THE HOUSEHOLD HEAD ‡ 14 YEARS OLD 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Property Right  -0.01  -0.03  0.01  -0.06  -0.01  -0.01  -0.18    0.05 
  (0.06)  (0.15)  (0.06)  (0.37)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.84)    (0.26) 
Property Right 1989                -0.34   
                (1.29)   
Property Right 1998                0.16   
                (0.77)   
Parcel Surface  0.00    0.00  0.00*  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00   
  (1.00)    (1.12)  (1.92)  (0.96)  (1.55)  (0.91)  (1.05)   
Distance to Creek  0.10    0.08  0.03  0.10  0.10  0.08  0.15   
  (0.95)    (0.81)  (0.43)  (0.89)  (1.26)  (0.77)  (1.43)   
Block Corner  -0.06    -0.01  0.14  -0.06  -0.06  -0.08  -0.06   
  (0.23)    (0.02)  (0.58)  (0.25)  (0.40)  (0.30)  (0.24)   
Distance to Non-Squatted  0.08    0.06  0.04  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08   
Area  (0.88)    (0.71)  (0.53)  (0.89)  (1.33)  (0.87)  (0.88)   
Age of Original Squatter<50  0.27      0.24  0.27  0.27  0.26  0.29   
  (1.47)      (1.53)  (1.59)  (1.61)  (1.41)  (1.57)   
Female Original Squatter  -0.02      -0.11  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02   
  (0.10)      (0.73)  (0.10)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.09)   
Argentine Original Squatter  -0.16      -0.10  -0.16  -0.16  -0.20  -0.12   
  (0.34)      (0.25)  (0.38)  (0.32)  (0.43)  (0.26)   
Years of Education of the   0.00      -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00   
Original Squatter  (0.04)      (0.30)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.09)   
Argentine Father of the   0.49      0.30  0.49*  0.49**  0.51  0.47   
Original Squatter  (1.33)      (0.89)  (1.71)  (2.22)  (1.39)  (1.27)   
Years of Education of   0.01      0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.01   
Original Squatter’s Father  (0.14)      (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.10)  (0.05)  (0.11)   
Argentine Mother of the   -0.12      0.07  -0.12  -0.12  -0.10  -0.08   
Original Squatter  (0.31)      (0.21)  (0.34)  (0.23)  (0.27)  (0.22)   
Years of Education of   0.04      0.02  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.05   
Original Squatter’s Mother  (0.47)      (0.25)  (0.48)  (0.62)  (0.52)  (0.53)   
Constant  0.48  1.69***  1.03**  0.76  0.48  0.48  0.65  0.27   
  (0.66)  (12.83)  (2.11)  (1.31)  (0.74)  (0.69)  (0.89)  (0.36)   
F-stat                3.16*   
Observations  313  313  313  425  313  313  313  313  290 
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of sons or daughters of the household head older than 13 years old living in the house. The household is the unit of 
observation. Column (1) is summarized in Column 3 of Table 6. Column (2) includes no controls, and Column (3) only controls for parcel characteristics. Column 
(4) adds the observations for the San Martin neighborhood. The standard errors are clustered at the block level in Column (5), and at the former owner level in 
Column (6). The 2SLS regression (instrumenting the treatment variable “Property Right” with the intention-to-treat variable “Property Right Offer”) is presented in 
Column (7). Column (8) shows separately the effect of early and late treatments. The F-stat tests the null hypothesis: Property Right 1989 = Property Right 1998. 
Column (9) presents the matching estimate using the propensity score of the probability of attrition (standard errors are bootstrapped using 100 replications). The 
control variables are described in Appendix Table A.1. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 






Appendix Table A.10 – NUMBER OF OTHER RELATIVES (NO SPOUSE OR OFFSPRING OF THE HOUSEHOLD HEAD) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Property Right  -0.68***  -0.53***  -0.55***  -0.56***  -0.68***  -0.68***  -0.90***    -0.70** 
  (3.53)  (2.75)  (2.75)  (3.23)  (3.51)  (4.97)  (3.97)    (2.37) 
Property Right 1989                -0.36   
                (1.36)   
Property Right 1998                -0.85***   
                (3.92)   
Parcel Surface  -0.00    0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00   
  (0.08)    (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.10)  (0.21)  (0.19)  (0.13)   
Distance to Creek  -0.08    -0.09  -0.02  -0.08  -0.08  -0.10  -0.13   
  (0.76)    (0.85)  (0.32)  (0.73)  (1.09)  (0.96)  (1.22)   
Block Corner  0.03    0.00  -0.06  0.03  0.03  0.00  0.03   
  (0.10)    (0.01)  (0.26)  (0.12)  (0.16)  (0.01)  (0.11)   
Distance to Non-Squatted  -0.12    -0.12  -0.07  -0.12  -0.12**  -0.12  -0.12   
Area  (1.23)    (1.18)  (0.86)  (1.32)  (2.17)  (1.23)  (1.22)   
Age of Original Squatter<50  -0.35*      -0.43***  -0.35*  -0.35*  -0.36*  -0.36*   
  (1.80)      (2.59)  (1.94)  (2.07)  (1.87)  (1.89)   
Female Original Squatter  0.32*      0.26  0.32*  0.32  0.32  0.32*   
  (1.66)      (1.56)  (1.77)  (1.56)  (1.63)  (1.65)   
Argentine Original Squatter  -0.71      -0.53  -0.71  -0.71  -0.76  -0.75   
  (1.49)      (1.26)  (1.48)  (1.36)  (1.59)  (1.57)   
Years of Education of the   -0.10*      -0.09**  -0.10**  -0.10  -0.10*  -0.10*   
Original Squatter  (1.78)      (2.09)  (2.08)  (1.66)  (1.76)  (1.84)   
Argentine Father of the   0.97**      0.86**  0.97*  0.97*  1.00***  1.00***   
Original Squatter  (2.54)      (2.43)  (1.91)  (1.84)  (2.61)  (2.61)   
Years of Education of   -0.06      -0.07  -0.06  -0.06  -0.07  -0.05   
Original Squatter’s Father  (0.65)      (0.93)  (0.51)  (0.62)  (0.75)  (0.63)   
Argentine Mother of the   -0.37      -0.31  -0.37  -0.37  -0.35  -0.40   
Original Squatter  (0.96)      (0.88)  (0.84)  (1.06)  (0.91)  (1.05)   
Years of Education of   0.03      -0.02  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.02   
Original Squatter’s Mother  (0.30)      (0.24)  (0.29)  (0.34)  (0.37)  (0.25)   
Constant  2.56***  1.25***  1.63***  2.55***  2.56***  2.56***  2.79***  2.77***   
  (3.42)  (8.66)  (3.05)  (4.21)  (3.73)  (5.05)  (3.66)  (3.66)   
F-stat                2.81*   
Observations  313  313  313  425  313  313  313  313  290 
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of household members excluding the household head, household head spouse and sons or daughters of the 
household head. The household is the unit of observation. Column (1) is summarized in Column 4 of Table 6. Column (2) includes no controls, and Column (3) 
only controls for parcel characteristics. Column (4) adds the observations for the San Martin neighborhood. The standard errors are clustered at the block level in 
Column (5), and at the former owner level in Column (6). The 2SLS regression (instrumenting the treatment variable “Property Right” with the intention-to-treat 
variable “Property Right Offer”) is presented in Column (7). Column (8) shows separately the effect of early and late treatments. The F -stat tests the null 
hypothesis: Property Right 1989 = Property Right 1998. Column (9) presents the matching estimate using the propensity score of the probability of attrition 
(standard errors are bootstrapped using 100 replications). The control variables are described in Appendix Table A.1. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 






Appendix Table A.11 – NUMBER OF OFFSPRING OF THE HOUSEHOLD HEAD 5-13 YEARS OLD 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
Property Right  -0.17  -0.22  -0.23  -0.21*  -0.17  -0.17  -0.12    -0.12     
  (1.18)  (1.51)  (1.56)  (1.66)  (1.23)  (0.99)  (0.72)    (0.75)     
Property Right 1989                -0.38*    -0.38*   
                (1.88)    (1.77)   
Property Right 1998                -0.06      -0.08 
                (0.37)      (0.46) 
Parcel Surface  0.00    0.00  -0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00       
  (0.14)    (0.24)  (0.21)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.17)  (0.18)       
Distance to Creek  0.01    -0.04  0.04  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.04       
  (0.10)    (0.49)  (0.86)  (0.11)  (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.53)       
Block Corner  -0.01    -0.01  -0.07  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01       
  (0.06)    (0.07)  (0.39)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.06)       
Distance to Non-Squatted   0.03    0.00  0.07  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03       
Area  (0.42)    (0.03)  (1.07)  (0.46)  (0.37)  (0.42)  (0.42)       
Age of Original Squatter<50  0.93***      0.76***  0.93***  0.93***  0.93***  0.94***       
  (6.48)      (6.28)  (5.95)  (13.02)  (6.50)  (6.56)       
Female Original Squatter  -0.15      -0.02  -0.15  -0.15  -0.15  -0.15       
  (1.03)      (0.19)  (1.01)  (1.00)  (1.02)  (1.02)       
Argentine Original Squatter  0.26      0.21  0.26  0.26  0.27  0.28       
  (0.72)      (0.69)  (0.71)  (0.78)  (0.75)  (0.79)       
Years of Education of the   -0.01      -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01       
Original Squatter  (0.35)      (0.17)  (0.36)  (0.46)  (0.36)  (0.31)       
Argentine Father of the   -0.29      -0.15  -0.29  -0.29  -0.30  -0.31       
Original Squatter  (1.03)      (0.57)  (0.94)  (1.00)  (1.05)  (1.09)       
Years of Education of   -0.13**      -0.13**  -0.13**  -0.13***  -0.13*  -0.13**       
Original Squatter’s Father  (1.99)      (2.36)  (2.18)  (3.07)  (1.95)  (2.02)       
Argentine Mother of the   -0.22      -0.29  -0.22  -0.22  -0.23  -0.20       
Original Squatter  (0.78)      (1.12)  (0.61)  (1.56)  (0.80)  (0.70)       
Years of Education of   0.05      0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05       
Original Squatter’s Mother  (0.70)      (0.74)  (0.64)  (0.53)  (0.69)  (0.75)       
Constant  1.17**  1.06***  1.07***  1.12**  1.17**  1.17***  1.12**  1.03*       
  (2.09)  (9.82)  (2.66)  (2.51)  (2.12)  (3.65)  (1.97)  (1.82)       
F-stat                2.19       
Observations  313  313  313  425  313  313  313  313  290  145  217 
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of sons or daughters of the household head between 5 and 13 years old living in the house. The household is the 
unit of observation. Column (1) is summarized in Column 5 of Table 6. Column (2) includes no controls, and Column (3) only controls for parcel characteristics. 
Column (4) adds the observations for the San Martin neighborhood. The standard errors are clustered at the block level in Column (5), and at the former owner 
level in Column (6). The 2SLS regression (instrumenting the treatment variable “Property Right” with the intention-to-treat variable “Property Right Offer”) is 
presented in Column (7). Column (8) is the regression summarized in Column 6 of Table 6, which shows separately the effect of early and late treatments. The F-
stat tests the null hypothesis: Property Right 1989 = Property Right 1998. For treatment, early treatment and late treatment, respectively, Columns (9) through (11) 
present the matching estimates using the propensity score of the probability of attrition (standard errors are bootstrapped using 100 replications). The control 
variables are described in Appendix Table A.1. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 






Appendix Table A.12 – NUMBER OF OFFSPRING OF THE HOUSEHOLD HEAD 0-4 YEARS OLD 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
Property Right  -0.07  -0.07  -0.07  -0.07  -0.07  -0.07*  -0.00    -0.06     
  (1.03)  (1.05)  (1.01)  (1.09)  (0.91)  (1.80)  (0.04)    (0.71)     
Property Right 1989                -0.08    -0.05   
                (0.81)    (0.42)   
Property Right 1998                -0.07      -0.04 
                (0.86)      (0.49) 
Parcel Surface  0.00    0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00       
  (0.78)    (0.93)  (0.23)  (0.67)  (0.85)  (0.87)  (0.79)       
Distance to Creek  -0.01    0.00  0.02  -0.01  -0.01  -0.00  -0.01       
  (0.21)    (0.04)  (0.68)  (0.20)  (0.31)  (0.03)  (0.17)       
Block Corner  -0.03    0.00  -0.00  -0.03  -0.03  -0.02  -0.03       
  (0.32)    (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.37)  (0.31)  (0.24)  (0.32)       
Distance to Non Squatted  0.03    0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03       
Area  (0.74)    (0.96)  (0.99)  (0.75)  (0.64)  (0.74)  (0.73)       
Age of Original Squatter<50  0.15**      0.15***  0.15**  0.15***  0.16**  0.15**       
  (2.23)      (2.60)  (2.12)  (4.65)  (2.28)  (2.22)       
Female Original Squatter  0.04      0.10*  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04       
  (0.55)      (1.70)  (0.58)  (0.80)  (0.57)  (0.55)       
Argentine Original Squatter  -0.28      -0.29*  -0.28*  -0.28***  -0.26  -0.28       
  (1.65)      (1.94)  (1.85)  (4.87)  (1.55)  (1.64)       
Years of Education of the   0.01      -0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01       
Original Squatter  (0.51)      (1.01)  (0.59)  (0.66)  (0.50)  (0.51)       
Argentine Father of the   0.11      0.10  0.11  0.11  0.10  0.11       
Original Squatter  (0.81)      (0.81)  (1.09)  (1.38)  (0.74)  (0.80)       
Years of Education of   -0.00      -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  0.00  -0.00       
Original Squatter’s Father  (0.05)      (0.01)  (0.05)  (0.11)  (0.04)  (0.05)       
Argentine Mother of the   0.02      0.03  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02       
Original Squatter  (0.16)      (0.27)  (0.20)  (0.34)  (0.11)  (0.16)       
Years of Education of   -0.03      -0.01  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03       
Original Squatter’s Mother  (0.89)      (0.17)  (0.91)  (0.95)  (0.94)  (0.88)       
Constant  0.32  0.33***  0.15  0.35*  0.32  0.32  0.25  0.31       
  (1.20)  (6.78)  (0.84)  (1.65)  (1.09)  (1.63)  (0.92)  (1.16)       
F-stat                0.01       
Observations  313  313  313  425  313  313  313  313  290  145  217 
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of sons or daughters of the household head between 0 and 4 years old living in the house. The household is the unit 
of observation. Column (1) is summarized in Column 7 of Table 6. Column (2) includes no controls, and Column (3) only controls for parcel characteristics. 
Column (4) adds the observations for the San Martin neighborhood. The standard errors are clustered at the block level in Column (5), and at the former owner 
level in Column (6). The 2SLS regression (instrumenting the treatment variable “Property Right” with the intention-to-treat variable “Property Right Offer”) is 
presented in Column (7). Column (8) is the regression summarized in Column 8 of Table 6, which shows separately the effect of early and late treatments. The F-
stat tests the null hypothesis: Property Right 1989 = Property Right 1998. For treatment, early treatment and late treatment, respectively, Columns (9) through (11) 
present the matching estimates using the propensity score of the probability of attrition (standard errors are bootstrapped using 100 replications). The control 
variables are described in Appendix Table A.1. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 




Appendix Table A.13 – SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT (OFFSPRING OF THE HOUSEHOLD HEAD 5-13 YEARS OLD) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Property Right  0.15  0.05  0.12  0.10  0.15  0.15  0.15  0.21    0. 02     
  (1.28)  (0.47)  (1.06)  (0.90)  (1.25)  (1.08)  (1.15)  (1.36)    (0.18)     
Property Right 1989                  0.42**    0.45**   
                  (2.20)    (2.46)   
Property Right 1998                  0.05      0.01 
                  (0.40)      (0.05) 
Parcel Surface  -0.00    -0.00  0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00       
  (0.98)    (0.84)  (0.00)  (0.94)  (0.99)  (1.60)  (0.94)  (1.11)       
Distance to Creek  0.08    0.09  -0.00  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.04       
  (1.13)    (1.41)  (0.09)  (1.14)  (0.98)  (1.08)  (1.21)  (0.62)       
Block Corner  0.07    0.10  0.05  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.08  0.09       
  (0.40)    (0.69)  (0.34)  (0.40)  (0.42)  (0.52)  (0.46)  (0.55)       
Distance to Non-Squatted Area  -0.07    -0.05  -0.09  -0.07  -0.07  -0.07  -0.08  -0.08       
  (1.08)    (0.72)  (1.50)  (1.08)  (1.15)  (1.49)  (1.16)  (1.12)       
Male  -0.02  -0.03  -0.00  -0.03  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.01       
  (0.18)  (0.30)  (0.02)  (0.28)  (0.15)  (0.13)  (0.18)  (0.18)  (0.11)       
Child Age  -0.11***  -0.12***  -0.11***  -0.11***  -0.11***  -0.11***  -0.11***  -0.11***  -0.11***       
  (5.37)  (5.50)  (5.27)  (5.67)  (5.25)  (5.76)  (7.45)  (5.38)  (5.28)       
Age of Original Squatter<50  -0.05      -0.06  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  -0.06       
  (0.34)      (0.52)  (0.34)  (0.35)  (0.58)  (0.37)  (0.46)       
Female Original Squatter   0.10      0.12  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.11  0.08       
  (0.82)      (1.15)  (0.81)  (0.76)  (0.61)  (0.88)  (0.66)       
Argentine Original Squatter   0.07      0.19  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.08  0.03       
  (0.21)      (0.66)  (0.23)  (0.26)  (0.36)  (0.25)  (0.10)       
Years of Education of the   0.05      0.07**  0.05  0.05  0.05**  0.05  0.05       
Original Squatter  (1.49)      (2.45)  (1.32)  (1.42)  (2.18)  (1.42)  (1.53)       
Argentine Father of the   -0.36      -0.29  -0.36  -0.36  -0.36  -0.38  -0.33       
Original Squatter  (1.46)      (1.18)  (1.64)  (1.52)  (1.65)  (1.53)  (1.36)       
Years of Education of   0.03      0.06  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03       
Original Squatter’s Father  (0.45)      (1.01)  (0.47)  (0.51)  (0.68)  (0.45)  (0.51)       
Argentine Mother of the   0.26      0.20  0.26  0.26  0.26*  0.26  0.22       
Original Squatter  (1.23)      (0.98)  (1.07)  (0.91)  (2.13)  (1.26)  (1.07)       
Years of Education of   0.02      0.00  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.00       
Original Squatter’s Mother  (0.26)      (0.01)  (0.25)  (0.25)  (0.23)  (0.32)  (0.04)       
Constant  -0.24  0.11  0.10  -0.58  -0.24  -0.24  -0.24  -0.28  -0.07       
  (0.48)  (0.48)  (0.27)  (1.35)  (0.52)  (0.51)  (0.58)  (0.55)  (0.13)       
F-stat                  3.19*       
Observations  273  273  273  355  273  273  273  273  273  254  134  204 
Notes: The dependent variable is the difference between the school grade each child is currently attending or the maximum grade attained (if not attending school) 
minus the grade corresponding to the child age. The child is the unit of observation. Column (1) is summarized in Column 1 of Table 7. Column (2) only controls 
for child age and gender. Column (3) controls for child age, child gender and parcel characteristics. Column (4) adds the observations for the San Martin 
neighborhood. The standard errors are clustered at the household level in Column (5), at the block level in Column (6), and at the former owner level in Column 
(7). The 2SLS regression (instrumenting the treatment variable “Property Right” with the intention-to-treat variable “Property Right Offer”) is presented in Column 
(8). Column (9) is the regression summarized in Column 2 of Table 7, which shows separately the effect of early and late treatments. The F-stat tests the null 
hypothesis: Property Right 1989 = Property Right 1998. For treatment, early treatment and late treatment, respectively, Columns (10) through (12) present the 
matching estimates using the propensity score of the probability of attrition (standard errors are bootstrapped using 100 replications). The control variables are 




Appendix Table A.14 - SCHOOL ABSENTEEISM (OFFSPRING OF THE HOUSEHOLD HEAD 5-13 YEARS OLD) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Property Right  -0.39**  -0.34**  -0.39**  -0.29**  -0.39**  -0.39**  -0.39*  -0.45**    -0.39**     
  (2.43)  (2.38)  (2.54)  (2.14)  (2.14)  (2.21)  (1.83)  (2.17)    (2.41)     
Property Right 1989                  -0.55**    -0.73***   
                  (2.12)    (2.79)   
Property Right 1998                  -0.33*      -0.51** 
                  (1.86)      (2.46) 
Parcel Surface  -0.00    0.00  0.00**  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00       
  (0.07)    (0.35)  (2.10)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.10)  (0.01)       
Distance to Creek  -0.16*    -0.13  -0.06  -0.16  -0.16  -0.16  -0.16*  -0.13       
  (1.72)    (1.51)  (0.97)  (1.09)  (1.07)  (1.08)  (1.78)  (1.43)       
Block Corner  0.11    0.11  0.15  0.11  0.11  0.11  0.10  0.10       
  (0.49)    (0.53)  (0.75)  (0.36)  (0.39)  (0.41)  (0.44)  (0.43)       
Distance to Non-Squatted Area  -0.04    -0.02  0.01  -0.04  -0.04  -0.04  -0.04  -0.04       
  (0.48)    (0.28)  (0.15)  (0.26)  (0.25)  (0.25)  (0.41)  (0.46)       
Male  -0.01  -0.02  -0.05  -0.02  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01       
  (0.05)  (0.17)  (0.32)  (0.16)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.09)       
Child Age  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.02  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03       
  (0.92)  (0.97)  (1.04)  (0.90)  (0.85)  (0.87)  (0.73)  (0.90)  (0.96)       
Age of Original Squatter<50  -0.16      -0.19  -0.16  -0.16  -0.16  -0.16  -0.15       
  (0.94)      (1.33)  (0.77)  (0.74)  (0.81)  (0.91)  (0.87)       
Female Original Squatter   0.18      0.14  0.18  0.18  0.18  0.18  0.20       
  (1.15)      (1.03)  (1.07)  (0.92)  (1.49)  (1.09)  (1.21)       
Argentine Original   -0.35      -0.04  -0.35  -0.35  -0.35  -0.36  -0.33       
Squatter  (0.79)      (0.11)  (0.91)  (0.92)  (1.44)  (0.83)  (0.74)       
Years of Education of the   -0.01      -0.02  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01       
Original Squatter  (0.19)      (0.45)  (0.18)  (0.19)  (0.20)  (0.14)  (0.20)       
Argentine Father of the   0.24      -0.02  0.24  0.24  0.24  0.26  0.23       
Original Squatter  (0.73)      (0.08)  (0.86)  (0.81)  (0.70)  (0.79)  (0.68)       
Years of Education of   -0.14*      -0.11  -0.14**  -0.14**  -0.14**  -0.14*  -0.14*       
Original Squatter’s Father  (1.83)      (1.59)  (2.37)  (2.16)  (2.97)  (1.83)  (1.85)       
Argentine Mother of the   0.40      0.45*  0.40  0.40  0.40*  0.40  0.42       
Original Squatter  (1.44)      (1.76)  (1.64)  (1.54)  (1.80)  (1.41)  (1.50)       
Years of Education of   0.14      0.13  0.14  0.14  0.14**  0.14  0.15       
Original Squatter’s Mother  (1.52)      (1.62)  (1.46)  (1.39)  (2.19)  (1.47)  (1.61)       
Constant  1.21*  0.96***  1.17**  0.37  1.21  1.21  1.21  1.25*  1.10       
  (1.80)  (3.15)  (2.42)  (0.69)  (1.46)  (1.41)  (1.71)  (1.85)  (1.61)       
F-stat                  0.65       
Observations  271  271  271  352  271  271  271  271  271  253  133  203 
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of days each child missed school out of the last five days of classes. The child is the unit of observation. Column (1) is 
summarized in Column 3 of Table 7. Column (2) only controls for child age and gender. Column (3) controls for child age, child gender and parcel characteristics. 
Column (4) adds the observations  for the San Martin neighborhood. The standard errors are clustered at the household level in Column (5), at the block level in 
Column (6), and at the former owner level in Column (7). The 2SLS regression (instrumenting the treatment variable “Property Right” with the intention-to-treat 
variable “Property Right Offer”) is presented in Column (8). Column (9) is the regression summarized in Column 4 of Table 7, which shows separately the effect of 
early and late treatments. The F -stat tests the null hypothesis: Property Right 1989 = Property Right 1998. For treatment, early treatment and late treatment, 
respectively, Columns (10) through (12) present the matching estimates using the propensity score of the probability of attrition (standard errors are bootstrapped 
using 100 replications). The control variables are described in Appendix Table A.1. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 






Appendix Table A.15 – ACCESS TO CREDIT 
Credit Card 
& Bank Account 
Non-Mortgage Loan 
Received 
Informal Credit  Grocery Store Credit  Mortgage Loan 
Received 
 
(1)  (2)   (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Property Right  -0.01    0.01    -0.06    0.01    0.02   
  (0.71)    (0.19)    (1.00)    (0.16)    (1.58)   
Property Right 1989    -0.01    0.01    -0.04    0.02    0.04*** 
    (0.41)    (0.24)    (0.50)    (0.31)    (3.19) 
Property Right 1998    -0.02    0.00    -0.07    0.00    0.00 
    (0.70)    (0.11)    (1.03)    (0.01)    (0.06) 
Parcel Surface  0.00  0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  0.00  0.00 
  (1.24)  (1.24)  (0.50)  (0.50)  (1.10)  (1.11)  (0.64)  (0.65)  (0.38)  (0.30) 
Distance to Creek  0.02*  0.02*  -0.01  -0.01  -0.03  -0.03  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  -0.00 
  (1.95)  (1.82)  (0.71)  (0.72)  (0.98)  (1.03)  (0.29)  (0.36)  (0.34)  (0.51) 
Block Corner  -0.00  -0.00  -0.05  -0.05  -0.13  -0.13  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02 
  (0.07)  (0.07)  (1.06)  (1.06)  (1.60)  (1.59)  (0.30)  (0.30)  (1.37)  (1.41) 
Distance to Non-Squatted   0.00  0.00  -0.03  -0.03  -0.00  -0.00  -0.03  -0.03  -0.00  -0.00 
Area  (0.19)  (0.19)  (1.62)  (1.62)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (1.22)  (1.22)  (0.44)  (0.43) 
Age of Original Squatter<50  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.10*  0.10  0.07  0.06  -0.00  -0.00 
  (0.53)  (0.53)  (0.66)  (0.65)  (1.65)  (1.63)  (1.24)  (1.22)  (0.34)  (0.49) 
Female Original Squatter  -0.00  -0.00  -0.05  -0.05  0.02  0.02  -0.08  -0.08  0.01  0.00 
  (0.20)  (0.21)  (1.32)  (1.32)  (0.28)  (0.28)  (1.44)  (1.44)  (0.52)  (0.51) 
Argentine Original Squatter  -0.00  -0.01  -0.01  -0.02  0.01  0.00  0.22*  0.22*  0.01  0.00 
  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (1.71)  (1.69)  (0.31)  (0.16) 
Years of Education of the   0.01  0.01  -0.00  -0.00  -0.02  -0.02  -0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.00 
Original Squatter  (1.34)  (1.33)  (0.25)  (0.25)  (1.06)  (1.07)  (0.33)  (0.34)  (0.70)  (0.62) 
Argentine Father of the   -0.02  -0.02  -0.07  -0.07  0.15  0.15  -0.02  -0.02  -0.00  0.00 
Original Squatter  (0.60)  (0.59)  (1.03)  (1.03)  (1.27)  (1.28)  (0.17)  (0.16)  (0.01)  (0.10) 
Years of Education of   0.03***  0.03***  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.03  -0.02  -0.02  0.01  0.01* 
Original Squatter’s Father  (2.82)  (2.82)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (1.19)  (1.19)  (0.72)  (0.72)  (1.65)  (1.72) 
Argentine Mother of the   0.03  0.03  0.10  0.10  -0.02  -0.02  -0.00  -0.00  0.00  0.00 
Original Squatter  (0.77)  (0.76)  (1.34)  (1.33)  (0.17)  (0.18)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.24)  (0.11) 
Years of Education of   -0.02*  -0.02*  0.04**  0.04**  0.04  0.04  0.01  0.01  -0.01*  -0.01* 
Original Squatter’s Mother  (1.75)  (1.75)  (2.09)  (2.08)  (1.31)  (1.29)  (0.53)  (0.52)  (1.68)  (1.79) 
Constant  -0.14*  -0.14*  0.06  0.06  0.23  0.24  0.25  0.26  -0.03  -0.01 
  (1.77)  (1.72)  (0.40)  (0.42)  (1.03)  (1.07)  (1.24)  (1.26)  (0.82)  (0.35) 
F-stat    0.02    0.02    0.10    0.08    8.61*** 
Observations  312  312  312  312  302  302  312  312  312  312 
Notes: Credit Card & Bank Account is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the household head has a credit card or bank account, and 0 otherwise. Non-Mortgage Loan 
Received and Mortgage Loan Received are dummy variables that equal 1 if the household has ever received from a bank, government, union, or cooperative, formal 
non-mortgage credit or formal mortgage credit, respectively, and 0 otherwise. Informal Credit is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the household has received informal 
credit from relatives, colleagues, neighbors or friends in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. Grocery Store Credit is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the household 
usually receives on trust credit from grocery stores, and 0 otherwise. The household is the unit of observation. Columns (1), (3), (5), (7), (9) and (10) are summarized in 
Table 8. The F-stat test the null hypotheses: Property Right 1989 = Property Right 1998. The control variables are described in Appendix Table A.1. Absolute values of 
t statistics are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 













Income per Capita 
Total Household 




(1)  (2)   (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Property Right  -27.35    -43.56    1.04    -4.45    0.03   
  (1.10)    (1.27)    (0.13)    (0.38)    (0.63)   
Property Right 1989    -22.07    -32.71    8.91    -6.89    0.05 
    (0.63)    (0.69)    (0.82)    (0.43)    (0.64) 
Property Right 1998    -30.34    -49.85    -3.52    -3.04    0.02 
    (1.06)    (1.27)    (0.39)    (0.23)    (0.43) 
Parcel Surface  -0.10  -0.10  0.01  0.01  -0.01  -0.01  0.01  0.01  -0.00  -0.00 
  (0.62)  (0.62)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.21)  (0.22)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.94)  (0.94) 
Distance to Creek  8.25  7.45  13.69  11.98  2.83  1.59  0.66  1.05  -0.01  -0.01 
  (0.63)  (0.55)  (0.76)  (0.64)  (0.69)  (0.37)  (0.11)  (0.17)  (0.32)  (0.38) 
Block Corner  29.72  30.02  32.25  32.54  12.97  13.18  14.00  13.93  -0.11  -0.11 
  (0.80)  (0.80)  (0.62)  (0.63)  (1.10)  (1.11)  (0.80)  (0.80)  (1.46)  (1.45) 
Distance to Non-Squatted   0.59  0.73  10.95  11.20  0.72  0.91  1.29  1.23  0.06**  0.06** 
Area  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.64)  (0.66)  (0.19)  (0.23)  (0.22)  (0.21)  (2.24)  (2.23) 
Age of Original Squatter<50  17.67  17.50  -17.51  -18.21  -12.50  -13.01  8.30  8.46  0.09*  0.08* 
  (0.70)  (0.70)  (0.51)  (0.52)  (1.58)  (1.64)  (0.71)  (0.72)  (1.68)  (1.65) 
Female Original Squatter  -50.45**  -50.21**  -62.87*  -62.54*  -8.49  -8.26  -14.47  -14.54  -0.10*  -0.10* 
  (2.01)  (1.99)  (1.80)  (1.78)  (1.06)  (1.03)  (1.22)  (1.23)  (1.96)  (1.96) 
Argentine Original Squatter  -15.10  -15.67  18.43  17.40  29.03  28.28  39.15  39.38  -0.05  -0.05 
  (0.25)  (0.26)  (0.22)  (0.21)  (1.51)  (1.47)  (1.38)  (1.39)  (0.37)  (0.38) 
Years of Education of the   3.20  3.14  9.52  9.44  5.29**  5.23**  4.13  4.15  0.01  0.01 
Original Squatter  (0.46)  (0.45)  (0.99)  (0.98)  (2.40)  (2.37)  (1.27)  (1.27)  (0.59)  (0.58) 
Argentine Father of the   -20.68  -20.47  -9.10  -8.62  -20.63  -20.28  -40.66*  -40.77*  0.07  0.07 
Original Squatter  (0.44)  (0.44)  (0.14)  (0.13)  (1.38)  (1.36)  (1.85)  (1.85)  (0.67)  (0.68) 
Years of Education of   4.36  4.40  23.45  23.51  2.88  2.93  -1.35  -1.36  0.01  0.01 
Original Squatter’s Father  (0.41)  (0.41)  (1.45)  (1.45)  (0.78)  (0.79)  (0.25)  (0.25)  (0.48)  (0.49) 
Argentine Mother of the   20.29  19.78  -69.84  -71.01  -3.35  -4.20  3.87  4.14  0.00  0.00 
Original Squatter  (0.44)  (0.43)  (1.09)  (1.10)  (0.23)  (0.29)  (0.18)  (0.19)  (0.05)  (0.03) 
Years of Education of   -10.69  -10.80  -2.67  -2.88  -4.09  -4.24  -2.35  -2.31  -0.01  -0.01 
Original Squatter’s Mother  (0.92)  (0.93)  (0.16)  (0.17)  (1.09)  (1.13)  (0.42)  (0.41)  (0.40)  (0.41) 
Constant  313.47***  316.34***  246.89*  253.17*  44.44  48.99  97.59**  96.18**  0.67***  0.68*** 
  (3.34)  (3.33)  (1.88)  (1.90)  (1.48)  (1.61)  (2.20)  (2.14)  (3.41)  (3.41) 
F-stat    0.05    0.11    1.10    0.05    0.07 
Observations  251  251  255  255  255  255  255  255  310  310 
Notes: Household Head Income is the total income earned by the household head in the previous month. Total Household Income is the total income earned by all the 
household members in the previous month. Total Household Income per Capita is Total Household Income divided by the number of household members. Total 
Household Income per Adult is Total Household Income divided by the number of household members older than 16 years old. All income variables are measured in 
Argentine pesos. Employed Household Head is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the household head was employed the week before the survey, and 0 otherwise. The 
household is the unit of observation. Columns (1), (3), (5), (7), and (9) are summarized in Table 9. The F-stat test the null hypotheses: Property Right 1989 = Property 
Right 1998.  The control variables are described in Appendix Table A.1. Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
 